On the Strategy and Behavior of Bitcoin Mining with N-attackers

Selfish mining is a well-known mining attack strategy discovered by Eyal and Sirer in 2014. After that, the attackers' strategy has been further discussed by many other works, which analyze the strategy and behavior of a single attacker. The extension of the strategy research is greatly restricted by the assumption that there is only one attacker in the blockchain network, since, in many cases, a proof of work blockchain has multiple attackers. The attackers can be independent of others instead of sharing information and attacking the blockchain as a whole. In this paper, we will establish a new model to analyze the miners' behavior in a proof of work blockchain with multiple attackers. Based on our model, we extend the attackers' strategy by proposing a new strategy set publish-n. Meanwhile, we will also review other attacking strategies such as selfish mining and stubborn mining in our model to explore whether these strategies work or not when there are multiple attackers. The performances of different strategies are compared using relative stale block rate of the attackers. In a proof of work blockchain model with two attackers, strategy publish-n can beat selfish mining by up to 26.3%.

[1]  Ittay Eyal,et al.  The Miner's Dilemma , 2014, 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.

[2]  W. Marsden I and J , 2012 .

[3]  Kartik Nayak,et al.  Stubborn Mining: Generalizing Selfish Mining and Combining with an Eclipse Attack , 2016, 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P).

[4]  Meni Rosenfeld,et al.  Analysis of Hashrate-Based Double Spending , 2014, ArXiv.

[5]  Aviv Zohar,et al.  Optimal Selfish Mining Strategies in Bitcoin , 2015, Financial Cryptography.

[6]  Hubert Ritzdorf,et al.  Tampering with the Delivery of Blocks and Transactions in Bitcoin , 2015, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[7]  Hubert Ritzdorf,et al.  On the Security and Performance of Proof of Work Blockchains , 2016, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[8]  Aviv Zohar,et al.  Secure High-Rate Transaction Processing in Bitcoin , 2015, Financial Cryptography.

[9]  Emin Gün Sirer,et al.  Majority is not enough , 2013, Financial Cryptography.

[10]  Ghassan O. Karame,et al.  Double-spending fast payments in bitcoin , 2012, CCS.

[11]  Christian Decker,et al.  Information propagation in the Bitcoin network , 2013, IEEE P2P 2013 Proceedings.

[12]  Sushmita Ruj,et al.  Bitcoin Block Withholding Attack: Analysis and Mitigation , 2017, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security.

[13]  Ethan Heilman,et al.  Eclipse Attacks on Bitcoin's Peer-to-Peer Network , 2015, USENIX Security Symposium.

[14]  Bruce M. Kapron,et al.  On Generic Constructions of Circularly-Secure, Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Encryption Schemes , 2016, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[15]  Yongdae Kim,et al.  Be Selfish and Avoid Dilemmas: Fork After Withholding (FAW) Attacks on Bitcoin , 2017, CCS.

[16]  Jeffrey S. Rosenschein,et al.  Bitcoin Mining Pools: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis , 2015, AAMAS.