A Survey of Code Reuse Attack and Defense
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Per Larsen,et al. Readactor: Practical Code Randomization Resilient to Memory Disclosure , 2015, 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
[2] Lucas Davi,et al. ROPdefender: a detection tool to defend against return-oriented programming attacks , 2011, ASIACCS '11.
[3] Bing Mao,et al. DROP: Detecting Return-Oriented Programming Malicious Code , 2009, ICISS.
[4] Zhenkai Liang,et al. Jump-oriented programming: a new class of code-reuse attack , 2011, ASIACCS '11.
[5] Hovav Shacham,et al. Return-oriented programming without returns , 2010, CCS '10.
[6] Michael Backes,et al. Oxymoron: Making Fine-Grained Memory Randomization Practical by Allowing Code Sharing , 2014, USENIX Security Symposium.
[7] Claude Castelluccia,et al. Defending embedded systems against control flow attacks , 2009, SecuCode '09.
[8] Yutao Liu,et al. Thwarting Memory Disclosure with Efficient Hypervisor-enforced Intra-domain Isolation , 2015, CCS.
[9] Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi,et al. Dynamic integrity measurement and attestation: towards defense against return-oriented programming attacks , 2009, STC '09.
[10] William W. Streilein,et al. Timely Rerandomization for Mitigating Memory Disclosures , 2015, CCS.
[11] Hovav Shacham,et al. The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: return-into-libc without function calls (on the x86) , 2007, CCS '07.
[12] Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi,et al. Just-In-Time Code Reuse: On the Effectiveness of Fine-Grained Address Space Layout Randomization , 2013, 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
[13] Hovav Shacham,et al. Return-Oriented Programming: Systems, Languages, and Applications , 2012, TSEC.
[14] Kevin W. Hamlen,et al. Binary stirring: self-randomizing instruction addresses of legacy x86 binary code , 2012, CCS.
[15] Wenke Lee,et al. ASLR-Guard: Stopping Address Space Leakage for Code Reuse Attacks , 2015, CCS.
[16] Hovav Shacham,et al. When good instructions go bad: generalizing return-oriented programming to RISC , 2008, CCS.
[17] Cristiano Giuffrida,et al. Enhanced Operating System Security Through Efficient and Fine-grained Address Space Randomization , 2012, USENIX Security Symposium.
[18] Hovav Shacham,et al. On the effectiveness of address-space randomization , 2004, CCS '04.
[19] Salvatore J. Stolfo,et al. Heisenbyte: Thwarting Memory Disclosure Attacks using Destructive Code Reads , 2015, CCS.
[20] Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi,et al. Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming: On the Difficulty of Preventing Code Reuse Attacks in C++ Applications , 2015, 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
[21] David A. Wagner,et al. ROP is Still Dangerous: Breaking Modern Defenses , 2014, USENIX Security Symposium.
[22] Claude Castelluccia,et al. Code injection attacks on harvard-architecture devices , 2008, CCS.
[23] Bhavani M. Thuraisingham,et al. Differentiating Code from Data in x86 Binaries , 2011, ECML/PKDD.
[24] Peng Ning,et al. Address Space Layout Permutation (ASLP): Towards Fine-Grained Randomization of Commodity Software , 2006, 2006 22nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'06).
[25] Debin Gao,et al. Launching Return-Oriented Programming Attacks against Randomized Relocatable Executables , 2011, 2011IEEE 10th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications.
[26] Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi,et al. Isomeron: Code Randomization Resilient to (Just-In-Time) Return-Oriented Programming , 2015, NDSS.
[27] Jack W. Davidson,et al. ILR: Where'd My Gadgets Go? , 2012, 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.
[28] Angelos D. Keromytis,et al. Smashing the Gadgets: Hindering Return-Oriented Programming Using In-place Code Randomization , 2012, 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.