The free-rider problem in intergroup conflicts over step-level and continuous public goods.

Free riding is a paramount consideration in intergroup conflicts becaus the benefits associated with such conflicts are public goods with respect to the members of a competing group. To study the free-rider problem and its effects on conflict resolution, (a) intergroup conflicts are modeled as team games; (b) a new team game that models intergroup conflicts over continuous public goods is introduced and is contrasted with a recently developed game that simulates intergroup conflicts over step-level public goods; (c) 2 experiments that compared the effects of communication in the 2 team games are reported.

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