Stable fractional matchings

Abstract We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). In this cardinal setting, stable fractional matchings can have much larger social welfare than stable integral ones. Our goal is to understand the computational complexity of finding an optimal (i.e., welfare-maximizing) stable fractional matching. We consider both exact and approximate stability notions, and provide simple approximation algorithms with weak welfare guarantees. Our main result is that, somewhat surprisingly, achieving better approximations is computationally hard. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first computational complexity results for stable fractional matchings in the cardinal model. En route to these results, we provide a number of structural observations that could be of independent interest.

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