Alleviating partisan gerrymandering: can math and computers help to eliminate wasted votes?

Partisan gerrymandering is a major cause for voter disenfranchisement in United States. However, convincing US courts to adopt specific measures to quantify gerrymandering has been of limited success to date. Recently, Stephanopoulos and McGhee introduced a new and precise measure of partisan gerrymandering via the so-called "efficiency gap" that computes the absolutes difference of wasted votes between two political parties in a two-party system. Quite importantly from a legal point of view, this measure was found legally convincing enough in a US appeals court in a case that claims that the legislative map of the state of Wisconsin was gerrymandered; the case is now pending in US Supreme Court. In this article, we show the following: (a) We provide interesting mathematical and computational complexity properties of the problem of minimizing the efficiency gap measure. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first non-trivial theoretical and algorithmic analyses of this measure of gerrymandering. (b) We provide a simple and fast algorithm that can "un-gerrymander" the district maps for the states of Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania by bring their efficiency gaps to acceptable levels from the current unacceptable levels. Our work thus shows that, notwithstanding the general worst case approximation hardness of the efficiency gap measure as shown by us,finding district maps with acceptable levels of efficiency gaps is a computationally tractable problem from a practical point of view. Based on these empirical results, we also provide some interesting insights into three practical issues related the efficiency gap measure. We believe that, should the US Supreme Court uphold the decision of lower courts, our research work and software will provide a crucial supporting hand to remove partisan gerrymandering.

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