Twenty Years on: The Evolution of Cooperation Revisited

This paper reviews Axelrod's work on the evolution of cooperation in terms of the generality of his findings. It is argued that while his results are to some degree sensitive to changes in the parametric assumptions he made, his and subsequent work provide a valuable general framework for the analysis of the conditions promoting cooperative play. In addition, this literature makes important methodological innovations through the evolutionary analysis of boundedly-rational interaction and learning using computer simulations.

[1]  Bjorn Lomborg,et al.  Nucleus and shield : the evolution of social structure in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma , 1996 .

[2]  R. May.  More evolution of cooperation , 1987, Nature.

[3]  Roger D. Congleton,et al.  Rationality, Morality, and Exit , 1992, American Political Science Review.

[4]  M. Nowak,et al.  THE SPATIAL DILEMMAS OF EVOLUTION , 1993 .

[5]  David P. Kraines,et al.  Learning to cooperate with Pavlov an adaptive strategy for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with noise , 1993 .

[6]  P. Molander.  The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment , 1985 .

[7]  Kristian Lindgren,et al.  Evolutionary phenomena in simple dynamics , 1992 .

[8]  A. Neyman.  Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma , 1985 .

[9]  Ulrich Mueller,et al.  Optimal Retaliation for Optimal Cooperation , 1987 .

[10]  John H. Nachbar,et al.  Evolution in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma , 1992 .

[11]  R. Boyd,et al.  No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game , 1987, Nature.

[12]  R. Axelrod.  An Evolutionary Approach to Norms , 1986, American Political Science Review.

[13]  M. M. Flood.  Some Experimental Games , 1958 .

[14]  Robert Hoffmann,et al.  The Evolution of Cooperation Revisited , 1996 .

[15]  R. Boyd.  Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game. , 1989, Journal of theoretical biology.

[16]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The evolution of cooperation. , 1984, Science.

[17]  M. Nowak,et al.  Evolutionary games and spatial chaos , 1992, Nature.

[18]  R. Lewontin.  ‘The Selfish Gene’ , 1977, Nature.

[19]  J. M. Smith,et al.  The Logic of Animal Conflict , 1973, Nature.

[20]  L. Samuelson,et al.  Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata , 1992 .

[21]  P. Taylor,et al.  Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics , 1978 .

[22]  P. Grim.  The undecidability of the spatialized prisoner's dilemma , 1997 .

[23]  M. Milinski.  TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation , 1987, Nature.

[24]  Dan Boneh,et al.  On genetic algorithms , 1995, COLT '95.

[25]  R. Aumann.  Survey of Repeated Games , 1981 .

[26]  Robert Hoffmann,et al.  The Ecology of Cooperation , 2001 .

[27]  Robert Hoffmann,et al.  Complexity Cost and Two Types of Noise in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma , 1997, ICANNGA.

[28]  Jonathan Bendor,et al.  Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation , 1993 .

[29]  E. Zeeman.  Dynamics of the evolution of animal conflicts , 1981 .

[30]  J. Holland,et al.  Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory , 1991 .

[31]  David B. Fogel,et al.  Evolving Behaviors in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma , 1993, Evolutionary Computation.

[32]  Robert Hoffmann,et al.  The Independent Localisations of Interaction and Learning in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma , 1999 .

[33]  Maximizing Expected Utilities in the Prisoner's Dilemma , 1992 .

[34]  John H. Miller,et al.  The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma , 1996 .

[35]  Josef Hofbauer,et al.  The theory of evolution and dynamical systems , 1988 .

[36]  Karl Sigmund,et al.  Games Of Life , 1993 .

[37]  P. Maître.  PLAYING FAIR GAME THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT , 1994 .

[38]  J. Hirshleifer,et al.  What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation? , 1988 .

[39]  Oliver Kirchkamp,et al.  Spatial Evolution of Automata in the Prisoner's Dilemma , 2000, Social Science Microsimulation.

[40]  J. Conlisk.  Conlisk : Why Bounded Rationality ? 671 , 2000 .

[41]  T. L. Schwartz.  The Logic of Collective Action , 1986 .

[42]  R. Axelrod.  More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma , 1980 .

[43]  John W. Payne,et al.  Effort and Accuracy in Choice , 1985 .

[44]  Glenn Ellison.  Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination , 1993 .

[45]  D. E. Matthews.  Evolution and the Theory of Games , 1977 .

[46]  Bruce G. Linster.  Evolutionary Stability in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Played by Two-State Moore Machines , 1992 .

[47]  J. R. Emshoff.  A computer simulation model of the Prisoner's Dilemma , 1970 .

[48]  Robert Axelrod,et al.  The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma , 2001 .

[49]  R. Axelrod,et al.  The Further Evolution of Cooperation , 1988, Science.

[50]  Mark D. Smucker,et al.  Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners: Evolutionary Results , 1995, ECAL.

[51]  M. Oliphant.  Evolving cooperation in the non-iterated prisoner''s dilemma , 1994 .

[52]  Roderick M. Kramer,et al.  When in Doubt... , 1991 .

[53]  Michael Taylor,et al.  Anarchy and cooperation , 1976 .

[54]  A. Rubinstein.  Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma , 1986 .

[55]  Herbert A. Simon,et al.  The Sciences of the Artificial , 1970 .

[56]  M. Olson,et al.  The Logic of Collective Action , 1965 .

[57]  R. Aumann,et al.  Cooperation and bounded recall , 1989 .