Transferable Utility Planning Games

Connecting between standard AI planning constructs and a classical cooperative model of transferable-utility coalition games, we introduce the notion of transferable-utility (TU) planning games. The key representational property of these games is that coalitions are valued implicitly based on their ability to carry out efficient joint plans. On the side of the expressiveness, we show that existing succinct representations of monotonic TU games can be efficiently compiled into TU planning games. On the side of computation, TU planning games allow us to provide some of the strongest to date tractability results for core-existence and core-membership queries in succinct TU coalition games.

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