Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Shuchi Chawla,et al. The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design , 2010, EC '10.
[2] S. Matthew Weinberg,et al. Pricing randomized allocations , 2009, SODA '10.
[3] Yu Zhou,et al. Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule , 2018, Games Econ. Behav..
[4] Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al. Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding , 2002 .
[5] Shigehiro Serizawa,et al. Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-Linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule , 2012 .
[6] Brian Baisa,et al. Auction Design Without Quasilinear Preferences , 2013 .
[7] H. Moulin,et al. Serial Cost Sharing , 1992 .
[8] Jason D. Hartline,et al. Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing , 2009, STOC '10.
[9] Alejandro M. Manelli,et al. Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist , 2006, J. Econ. Theory.
[10] P. Klemperer. What Really Matters in Auction Design , 2001 .
[11] Yves Sprumont. The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule , 1991 .
[12] L. Shapley,et al. The assignment game I: The core , 1971 .
[13] Jeremy I. Bulow,et al. Auctions versus Negotiations , 1996 .
[14] Bengt Holmstrom,et al. GROVES' SCHEME ON RESTRICTED DOMAINS , 1979 .
[15] Lars-Gunnar Svensson,et al. Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control , 2014 .
[16] Y. Narahari,et al. On Optimal Mechanisms in the Two-Item Single-Buyer Unit-Demand Setting , 2017, Journal of Mathematical Economics.
[17] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition , 2020, Oper. Res..
[18] Itai Ashlagi,et al. Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity , 2011, Soc. Choice Welf..
[19] Shigehiro Serizawa,et al. Vickrey allocation rule with income effect , 2008, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[20] N. Nisan,et al. Algorithmic Game Theory: Combinatorial Auctions , 2007 .
[21] J. Rochet,et al. Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening , 1998 .
[22] David Gale,et al. The core of the matching game , 1990 .
[23] Steven A. Matthews,et al. Low Reserve Prices in Auctions* , 2019, The Economic Journal.
[24] Debasis Mishra,et al. Mechanism Design Without Quasilinearity , 2017, Theoretical Economics.
[25] P. Jehiel,et al. On Absolute Auctions and Secret Reserve Prices , 2014 .
[26] Alejandro M. Manelli,et al. Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly , 2004, J. Econ. Theory.
[27] Mallesh M. Pai,et al. Discrimination via Symmetric Auctions , 2017 .
[28] Daniel R. Vincent,et al. Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model , 2010 .
[29] John Thanassoulis,et al. Haggling over substitutes , 2004, J. Econ. Theory.
[30] Toyotaka Sakai,et al. Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations , 2008 .
[31] Yves Sprumont,et al. Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms , 2011, J. Econ. Theory.
[32] Gabriel D. Carroll. Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening , 2017 .
[33] D. Gale,et al. The Strategy Structure of Two Sided Matching Markets , 1985 .
[34] Kim-Sau Chung,et al. A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence , 2007 .
[35] The Biggest Auction Ever : the Sale of the British 3 G Telecom Licences forthcoming , 2001 .
[36] D. Gale,et al. Multi-Item Auctions , 1986, Journal of Political Economy.
[37] S. Matthew Weinberg,et al. The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders , 2016, EC.
[38] Michel Gendreau,et al. Combinatorial auctions , 2007, Ann. Oper. Res..
[39] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..
[40] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Supply-limiting mechanisms , 2012, EC '12.
[41] H. Varian. Equity, Envy and Efficiency , 1974 .
[42] Faruk Gul,et al. WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM WITH GROSS SUBSTITUTES , 1999 .
[43] Shigehiro Serizawa,et al. Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market , 2019 .
[44] O. Ashenfelter,et al. Auctions and the Price of Art , 2003 .
[45] Lawerence M. Cramton Peter Ausubel. The optimality of being efficient: designing auctions , 1998 .
[46] Shigehiro Serizawa,et al. Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences , 2015, Soc. Choice Welf..
[47] Toyotaka Sakai,et al. An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear , 2013 .
[48] M. Jackson,et al. Strategy-Proof Exchange , 1995 .
[49] H. Leonard. Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions , 1983, Journal of Political Economy.
[50] Joseph M. Ostroy,et al. From the Assignment Model to Combinatorial Auctions , 2003 .
[51] Vasiliki Skreta,et al. Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment , 2013, J. Econ. Theory.
[52] Alex Gershkov,et al. On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities , 2019 .
[53] Christos Tzamos,et al. Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist , 2014, EC.
[54] Brian Baisa,et al. Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods , 2020 .
[55] Noam Nisan,et al. Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity , 2013, J. Econ. Theory.
[56] Dilip Mookherjee,et al. Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian incentive Compatible Allocation Rules , 1992 .
[57] M. Armstrong. Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing , 1996 .
[58] Toyotaka Sakai. Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price , 2013 .
[59] M. Armstrong. Optimal Multi-Object Auctions , 2000 .
[60] Tsuyoshi Adachi. Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains , 2014, Soc. Choice Welf..
[61] S. Hart,et al. Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations , 2015 .
[62] Vijay Krishna,et al. Efficient Mechanism Design , 1998 .
[63] Yang Cai,et al. Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization , 2012, 2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[64] R. McAfee,et al. Auctions and Bidding , 1986 .