论文信息 - Random paths to stability in the roommate problem

Random paths to stability in the roommate problem

This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable matching. This implies that, starting from any unstable matching, the process of allowing a randomly chosen blocking pair to form converges to a stable matching with probability one. This result generalizes those of Roth and Vande Vate [Econometrica 58 (1990) 1475] and Chung [Games Econ. Behav. 33 (2000) 206] under strict preferences.

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