Contractual Pr ovisions to Mitigate Holdup: Evidence fr om Infor mation T echnology Outsour cing

[1]  Benjamin E. Hermalin,et al.  Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems , 1998 .

[2]  Jeffrey H. Dyer,et al.  The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage , 1998 .

[3]  Joanne E. Oxley,et al.  The Scope and Governance of International R&D Alliances , 2003 .

[4]  Benjamin Klein,et al.  Why 'Hold-Ups' Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships , 1996 .

[5]  E. Hippel.  Sticky Information and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for Innovation , 1994 .

[6]  Sendil K. Ethiraj,et al.  Where Do Capabilities Come from and How Do They Matter? A Study in the Software Services Industry , 2005 .

[7]  Thomas P. Lyon,et al.  Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem , 2004 .

[8]  Rajiv Kishore,et al.  Management of Information Technology Outsourcing Relationships: The Role of Service Level Agreements , 2004, ICIS.

[9]  O. Williamson.  Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange , 1983 .

[10]  S. Reichelstein,et al.  Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment , 1995 .

[11]  Josh Lerner,et al.  Ownership and Control Rights in Internet Portal Alliances, 1995-1999 , 2003 .

[12]  Steven Tadelis,et al.  Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts , 2001 .

[13]  A. Banerjee,et al.  Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry , 1999 .

[14]  M. C. Jensen,et al.  Specific and General Knowledge and Organizational Structure , 1995 .

[15]  Shannon W. Anderson,et al.  Management Control for Market Transactions: The Relation Between Transaction Characteristics, Incomplete Contract Design, and Subsequent Performance , 2005, Manag. Sci..

[16]  Kevin J. Murphy,et al.  Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm , 1997 .

[17]  Maurice F. Greaver.  Strategic Outsourcing: A Structured Approach to Outsourcing Decisions and Initiatives , 1999 .

[18]  Seungjin Whang,et al.  Contracting for Software Development , 1992 .

[19]  S. Masten,et al.  Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length , 1988 .

[20]  M. Whinston,et al.  Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity , 1998 .

[21]  Barry W. Boehm,et al.  Software Engineering Economics , 1993, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering.

[22]  O. Hart,et al.  Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation , 1988 .

[23]  W. Evans,et al.  Finishing High School and Starting College: Do Catholic Schools Make a Difference? , 1995 .

[24]  Michael D. Whinston,et al.  Assessing the Property Rights and Transaction-Cost Theories of Firm Scope , 2001 .

[25]  Detmar W. Straub,et al.  IT Outsourcing Success: A Psychological Contract Perspective , 2004, Inf. Syst. Res..

[26]  Klaus M. Schmidt,et al.  Option Contracts and Renegotiation - A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem , 1995 .

[27]  W. Ouchi.  A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms , 1979 .

[28]  Leslie P. Willcocks,et al.  An Empirical Investigation of Information Technology Sourcing Practices: Lessons From Experience , 1998, MIS Q..

[29]  A. Stinchcombe.  Information and Organizations , 2019 .

[30]  Jan B. Heide,et al.  Interfirm Monitoring, Social Contracts, and Relationship Outcomes , 2007 .

[31]  Weidong Xia,et al.  Grasping the complexity of IS development projects , 2004, CACM.

[32]  O. Williamson.  Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization , 1993, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[33]  W. Rogerson.  Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem , 1992 .

[34]  D. A. Kenny,et al.  The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. , 1986, Journal of personality and social psychology.

[35]  Victor P. Goldberg,et al.  Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke , 1987, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[36]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The Evolution of Cooperation , 1984 .

[37]  James A. Brickley.  Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising* , 1999, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[38]  Jae-Nam Lee,et al.  IT Outsourcing Strategies: Universalistic, Contingency, and Configurational Explanations of Success , 2004, Inf. Syst. Res..

[39]  S. Masten,et al.  Econometrics of Contracts: an Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contracting , 2000 .

[40]  Mayuram S. Krishnan,et al.  Contracts in Offshore Software Development: An Empirical Analysis , 2003, Manag. Sci..

[41]  Anthony DiRomualdo,et al.  Strategic Intent for IT Outsourcing , 1998 .

[42]  Todd R. Zenger,et al.  Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements , 2002 .

[43]  Terry G. Seaks,et al.  A Hausman test for a dummy variable in probit , 1998 .

[44]  E. Fama,et al.  Agency Problems and Residual Claims , 1983 .

[45]  Per Strömberg,et al.  Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts , 2000 .

[46]  Tridas Mukhopadhyay,et al.  Software Project Duration and Effort: An Empirical Study , 2002, Inf. Technol. Manag..

[47]  Jean Tirole,et al.  A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality) , 1996 .

[48]  P. Joskow.  Contract duration and relationship-specific investments: Empirical evidence from coal markets , 1987 .

[49]  B. Klein,et al.  Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process , 1978, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[50]  O. Williamson.  Markets and Hierarchies , 1975 .

[51]  G. Latham,et al.  A Review of Research on the Application of Goal Setting in Organizations , 1975 .

[52]  D. Kvasov,et al.  Contracting on Time , 2003 .

[53]  Cynthia Mathis Beath,et al.  Hierarchical elements in software contracts , 1993 .