Models of Multilateral Negotiations and Ratification∗

Models of international negotiations have so far been severely limited, either by considering one-dimensional bargaining spaces or by reducing the set of negotiators to two parties. Such models can hardly reflect negotiations in the current international context, may it be in the realm of the European Union, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, etc. The lack of empirical correspondence becomes even more glaring, when the ratification of international treaties in these various organziations is considered. Thus, the paper proposes to take stock of the possibilities how existing multilateral bargaining models might be applied to negotiations of international treaties which are subject to domestic ratification processes. ∗ This paper emanates from the DOSEI (Domestic Structures and European Integration) project funded by the European Union in its Fifth Framework program and directed by Thomas König (Universität Speyer). Very preliminary versions of this paper were presented at the Universität Mannheim and at the Freie Universität Berlin, while a more complete version was delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2 5, 2004, Chicago, the ISA conference March 1-5, 2005, Hawaii and the the ECPR General conference September 8-10, 2005 Budapest. I gratefully acknowledge the very useful comments by participants at these events, especially by Michael Gilligan and Stefanie Walter, and the financial support of the Swiss Bundesamt für Bildung und Wissenschaft (Grant number BBW Nr 02.0313) and the Grundlagenforschungsfonds of the University of St. Gallen (Grant number G12161103). † Département de science politique, Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales; Université de Genève; 40, Bd du Pont d’Arve; 1211 Genève 4; Switzerland; phone ++41 22 379 83 78; email: simon.hug@unige.ch

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