The Positronic Economist: A Computational System for Analyzing Economic Mechanisms

Computational mechanism analysis is a recent approach to economic analysis in which a mechanism design setting is analyzed entirely by a computer. For games with non-trivial numbers of players and actions, the approach is only feasible when these games can be encoded compactly, e.g., as Action-Graph Games. Such encoding is currently a manual process requiring expert knowledge; our aim is to simplify and automate it. Our contribution, the Positronic Economist is a software system having two parts: (1) a Python-based language for succinctly describing mechanisms; and (2) a system that takes such descriptions as input, automatically identifies computationally useful structure, and produces a compact Action-Graph Game.

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