Economics, sociobiology and behavioral psychology on preferences

Abstract Economists have become increasingly interested in hypotheses from sociobiology as a source of inspiration for filling gaps in the economic model of behavior. To avoid borrowing eclectically and arbitrarily from neighboring disciplines, this paper attempts to outline in a systematic way the similarities and differences between the approaches taken in economics and sociobiology. In doing so, special attention is given to an empirical theory of preferences that is lacking in economics. Here, inspiration from sociobiology would seem to be particularly useful. The considerations in the paper suggest that sociobiological arguments may indeed be helpful, albeit at a very elementary level only. A more comprehensive theory cannot ignore the influences of innate learning mechanisms in higher living beings. An elaborated theory of preferences in economics will have to acknowledge and incorporate insights from behavioral psychology.

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