Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences

[1]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Two Case Studies for Trading Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences , 2014, AAAI.

[2]  Lars Ehlers,et al.  Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods , 2012, J. Econ. Theory.

[3]  A. Roth Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods , 1982 .

[4]  S. Pápai,et al.  Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange , 2000 .

[5]  C. Bird Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods , 1984 .

[6]  Eiichi Miyagawa,et al.  Strategy-Proofness and the Core in House Allocation Problems , 2002, Games Econ. Behav..

[7]  Tayfun Sönmez Strategy‐proofness and Essentially Single‐valued Cores , 1999 .

[8]  Andrew Postlewaite,et al.  Weak Versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods , 1977 .

[9]  C. G. Plaxton A Simple Family of Top Trading Cycles Mechanisms for Housing Markets with Indifferences , 2012 .

[10]  M. Satterthwaite,et al.  Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points , 1981 .

[11]  Jun Wako,et al.  Some Properties of Weak Domination in an Exchange Market with Indivisible Goods , 1991 .

[12]  L. Shapley,et al.  On cores and indivisibility , 1974 .

[13]  Atila Abdulkadiroglu,et al.  HOUSE ALLOCATION WITH EXISTING TENANTS , 1999 .

[14]  Haris Aziz,et al.  Housing Markets with Indifferences: A Tale of Two Mechanisms , 2012, AAAI.

[15]  Lars Ehlers,et al.  Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain , 2005, J. Econ. Theory.

[16]  Jorge Alcalde-Unzu,et al.  Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms , 2009, Games Econ. Behav..

[17]  Lars Ehlers,et al.  Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.

[18]  Paula Jaramillo,et al.  The Difference Indifference Makes in Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects , 2012, J. Econ. Theory.

[19]  Jinpeng Ma Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities , 1994 .