Remotegrity: Design and Use of an End-to-End Verifiable Remote Voting System

We propose and implement a cryptographically end-to-end verifiable (E2E) remote voting system for absentee voters and report on its deployment in a binding municipal election in Takoma Park, Maryland. Remotegrity is a hybrid mail/internet extension to the Scantegrity in-person voting system, enabling secure, electronic return of vote-by-mail ballots. It provides voters with the ability to detect unauthorized modifications to their cast ballots made by either malicious client software, or a corrupt election authority--two threats not previously studied in combination. Not only can the voter detect such changes, they can prove it to a third party without giving up ballot secrecy.

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