Evolution of Conventional Meaning and Conversational Principles

In this paper we study language use and language organisation by making use of Lewisean signalling games. Standard game theoretical approaches are contrasted with evolutionary ones to analyze conventional meaning and conversational interpretation strategies. It is argued that analyzing successful communication in terms of standard game theory requires agents to be very rational and fully informed. The main goal of the paper is to show that in terms of evolutionary game theory we can motivate the emergence and self-sustaining force of (i) conventional meaning and (ii) some conversational interpretation strategies in terms of weaker and, perhaps, more plausible assumptions.

[1]  H. Young,et al.  The Evolution of Conventions , 1993 .

[2]  D. Blackwell.  Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments , 1953 .

[3]  A. Wray.  Protolanguage as a holistic system for social interaction , 1998 .

[4]  M A Nowak,et al.  The evolutionary dynamics of grammar acquisition. , 2001, Journal of theoretical biology.

[5]  Brian Skyrms,et al.  Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information* , 2002, Philosophy of Science.

[6]  Peter L. Hurd.  Communication in discrete action-response games , 1995 .

[7]  Prashant Parikh,et al.  Communication and strategic inference , 1991 .

[8]  R. A. Fisher,et al.  The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection , 1931 .

[9]  A. Grafen.  Biological signals as handicaps. , 1990, Journal of theoretical biology.

[10]  P. Strawson.  Intention and Convention in Speech Acts , 1964 .

[11]  Jörgen W. Weibull,et al.  Evolutionary Game Theory , 1996 .

[12]  S. Kirby,et al.  The emergence of linguistic structure: an overview of the iterated learning model , 2002 .

[13]  J M Smith,et al.  Evolution and the theory of games , 1976 .

[14]  K. Wärneryd.  Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability , 1993 .

[15]  H. Grice.  Logic and conversation , 1975 .

[16]  Robert van Rooij,et al.  Pragmatic Meaning and Non-monotonic Reasoning: The Case of Exhaustive Interpretation , 2006 .

[17]  J. M. Smith,et al.  The Logic of Animal Conflict , 1973, Nature.

[18]  P. Taylor,et al.  Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics , 1978 .

[19]  William P. Alston,et al.  Knowledge and the Flow of Information , 1985 .

[20]  William Croft,et al.  Explaining language change : an evolutionary approach , 2000 .

[21]  Ariel Rubinstein,et al.  A Course in Game Theory , 1995 .

[22]  Luc Steels,et al.  The Emergence of Grammar in Communicating Autonomous Robotic Agents , 2000, ECAI.

[23]  Robert van Rooy,et al.  Quality and Quantity of Information Exchange , 2003, J. Log. Lang. Inf..

[24]  Tom Lenaerts,et al.  An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Perspective on Learning in Multi-Agent Systems , 2004, Synthese.

[25]  A. Zahavi.  Mate selection-a selection for a handicap. , 1975, Journal of theoretical biology.

[26]  M. Spence.  Job Market Signaling , 1973 .

[27]  T. Schelling.  The Strategy of Conflict , 1963 .

[28]  Robert van Rooy,et al.  SIGNALLING GAMES SELECT HORN STRATEGIES , 2004 .

[29]  L. Karttunen.  Syntax and Semantics of Questions , 1977 .

[30]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The Evolution of Cooperation , 1984 .

[31]  M Oliphant,et al.  The dilemma of Saussurean communication. , 1996, Bio Systems.

[32]  R. Rob,et al.  Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games , 1993 .

[33]  C. E. SHANNON,et al.  A mathematical theory of communication , 1948, MOCO.

[34]  James R. Hurford,et al.  Biological evolution of the Saussurean sign as a component of the language acquisition device , 1989 .

[35]  Reinhard Blutner,et al.  Some Aspects of Optimality in Natural Language Interpretation , 2000, J. Semant..

[36]  Maynard J. Smith,et al.  Animal Signals: Models and Terminology , 1995 .

[37]  Peter Vanderschraaf,et al.  Convention as correlated equilibrium , 1995 .

[38]  Prashant Parikh.  The use of language , 2001 .

[39]  James R. Hurford.  The Evolutionary Emergence of Language: Introduction: The Emergence of Syntax , 2000 .

[40]  Scott Weinstein,et al.  Centering: A Framework for Modeling the Local Coherence of Discourse , 1995, CL.

[41]  J. Sobel,et al.  STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION , 1982 .

[42]  R. Kirk.  Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories , 1985 .

[43]  B. Skyrms.  Evolution of the social contract , 1996 .

[44]  M A Nowak,et al.  The evolution of language. , 1999, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[45]  Brian Skyrms,et al.  Darwin Meets the Logic of Decision: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory , 1994, Philosophy of Science.

[46]  David Lightfoot,et al.  How to Set Parameters: Arguments from Language Change , 1991 .

[47]  John McCarthy,et al.  Circumscription - A Form of Non-Monotonic Reasoning , 1980, Artif. Intell..

[48]  Charles F. Hockett,et al.  A mathematical theory of communication , 1948, MOCO.

[49]  S. Levinson.  Presumptive Meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature , 2001 .

[50]  R. Selten.  A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts. , 1980, Journal of theoretical biology.