论文信息 - Knights and Knaves Run Elections: Internet Voting and Undetectable Electoral Fraud

Knights and Knaves Run Elections: Internet Voting and Undetectable Electoral Fraud

The cryptographic weaknesses recently discovered in SwissPost's e-voting system are described in this article. We explain how they relate to security problems in other Internet voting systems and discuss the necessary principles for building trustworthy elections.

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