Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a framed field experiment
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] J. Heckman,et al. Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences , 2009, Science.
[2] E. Fehr,et al. Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments , 1999, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[3] Nikos Nikiforakis,et al. Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement , 2012 .
[4] G. Harrison,et al. Field experiments , 1924, The Journal of Agricultural Science.
[5] U. Fischbacher,et al. The nature of human altruism , 2003, Nature.
[6] David G. Rand,et al. Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation , 2009, Science.
[7] B. Greiner,et al. Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment - An Experimental Study , 2011 .
[8] Daniel Balliet,et al. Reward, punishment, and cooperation: a meta-analysis. , 2011, Psychological bulletin.
[9] T. Yamagishi. The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good , 1986 .
[10] D. van Soest,et al. On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation , 2008 .
[11] D. D. de Quervain,et al. The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment , 2004, Science.
[12] H. Gintis. Strong reciprocity and human sociality. , 2000, Journal of theoretical biology.
[13] J. Ledyard. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research , 1994 .
[14] R. Boyd,et al. Explaining altruistic behavior in humans , 2003 .
[15] Andreas Nicklisch,et al. Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt - A Public Goods Experiment with Sanctions Under Uncertainty , 2010 .
[16] G. Brady. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action , 1993 .
[17] Louis Putterman,et al. Do Non-Strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism , 2003, Games Econ. Behav..
[18] E. Ostrom,et al. Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible , 1992, American Political Science Review.
[19] Rajiv Sethi,et al. The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use , 1996 .
[20] R. Hinde,et al. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Collective Action , 2010 .
[21] Jeffrey P. Carpenter,et al. The Demand for Punishment , 2007 .
[22] R Boyd,et al. Why people punish defectors. Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. , 2001, Journal of theoretical biology.
[23] Steven D. Levitt,et al. What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World , 2007 .
[24] Robert Shupp,et al. The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods , 2006 .
[25] J. O'Doherty,et al. Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others , 2006, Nature.
[26] E. Fehr,et al. Altruistic punishment in humans , 2002, Nature.
[27] P. Richerson,et al. Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups , 1992 .
[28] Marco Casari,et al. Peer punishment in teams: expressive or instrumental choice? , 2012, Experimental Economics.
[29] J. Stoop,et al. A tale of two carrots: the effectiveness of multiple reward stages in a common pool resource game , 2013 .
[30] Nikos Nikiforakis,et al. A Comparative Statics Analysis of Punishment in Public-Good Experiments , 2005 .
[31] Jan Stoop,et al. From the Lab to the Field: Cooperation among Fishermen , 2012, Journal of Political Economy.
[32] Charles R. Plott,et al. Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution , 2003 .
[33] Ananish Chaudhuri. Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature , 2011 .
[34] E. Ostrom,et al. Lab Experiments for the Study of Social-Ecological Systems , 2010, Science.
[35] John A. List,et al. Homo economicus Evolves , 2008, Science.