Where are you from?: confusing location distinction using virtual multipath camouflage

In wireless networks, location distinction aims to detect location changes or facilitate authentication of wireless users. To achieve location distinction, recent research has been focused on investigating the spatial uncorrelation property of wireless channels. Specifically, the differences of wireless channel characteristics are used to distinguish locations or identify location changes. However, we discover a new attack against all existing location distinction approaches that are built on the spatial uncorrelation property of wireless channels. In such an attack, the adversary can easily hide her location changes or impersonate movements by injecting fake wireless channel characteristics into a target receiver. Experimental results on our USRP-based prototype show that the discovered attack can craft any desired channel characteristic with a successful probability of 95.0% to defeat spatial uncorrelation based location distinction schemes. To defend against this attack, we propose a detection technique that utilizes an auxiliary receiver or antenna to identify these fake channel characteristics. Experiments demonstrate that our novel detection method achieves a detection rate higher than 91.2% while maintaining a very low false alarm rate.