The sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Michael D. Kirchhoff,et al. Extensive enactivism: why keep it all in? , 2014, Front. Hum. Neurosci..
[2] Zoe Drayson,et al. The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction , 2014 .
[3] E. Myin,et al. The structure of color experience and the existence of surface colors , 2014 .
[4] A. Seth. A predictive processing theory of sensorimotor contingencies: Explaining the puzzle of perceptual presence and its absence in synesthesia , 2014, Cognitive neuroscience.
[5] J. Hohwy. The Predictive Mind , 2013 .
[6] Mark Sprevak,et al. Fictionalism About Neural Representations , 2013 .
[7] A. Clark. Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. , 2013, The Behavioral and brain sciences.
[8] Xabier E. Barandiaran,et al. A Dynamical Systems Account of Sensorimotor Contingencies , 2013, Front. Psychol..
[9] M. Wheeler. Science Friction: Phenomenology, Naturalism and Cognitive Science , 2013, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement.
[10] H. Dreyfus. THE MYTH OF THE PERVASIVENESS OF THE MENTAL , 2013 .
[11] Daniel D. Hutto,et al. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content , 2012 .
[12] Ned Block,et al. Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness” , 2012 .
[13] A. Noë,et al. Varieties of Presence , 2012 .
[14] Kenneth J. Pope,et al. Visual Experiences during Paralysis , 2011, Front. Hum. Neurosci..
[15] Dave Ward,et al. Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience , 2011, Synthese.
[16] J. O'Regan,et al. Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness” , 2011, Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
[17] Robert D. Rupert. Embodiment, Consciousness, and the Massively Representational Mind , 2011 .
[18] Matthew T. Kaufman,et al. Cortical Preparatory Activity: Representation of Movement or First Cog in a Dynamical Machine? , 2010, Neuron.
[19] Mark Rowlands,et al. The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology , 2010 .
[20] K. Aizawa. Consciousness: Don't Give Up on the Brain , 2010, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement.
[21] T. Roberts,et al. Understanding ‘sensorimotor understanding’ , 2010 .
[22] A. Chemero. Radical Embodied Cognitive Science , 2009 .
[23] A. Goldman,et al. Is social cognition embodied? , 2009, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
[24] Julian Kiverstein,et al. Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action , 2009 .
[25] Gerard O'Brien,et al. The role of representation in computation , 2009, Cognitive Processing.
[26] Jim M. Monti,et al. Neural repetition suppression reflects fulfilled perceptual expectations , 2008, Nature Neuroscience.
[27] A. Noë,et al. Reply to Campbell, Martin, and Kelly , 2008 .
[28] J. Campbell. Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism , 2008 .
[29] Sean D. Kelly. Content and Constancy: phenomenology, psychology, and the content of perception , 2008 .
[30] M.G.F. Martin. Commentary on Action in Perception , 2008 .
[31] P. Carruthers. Higher‐Order Theories of Consciousness , 2007 .
[32] M. A. Khalidi. Innate Cognitive Capacities , 2007 .
[33] Hamid Vahid,et al. Conceivability and possibility , 2006 .
[34] J Kevin O'Regan,et al. Color naming, unique hues, and hue cancellation predicted from singularities in reflection properties. , 2006, Visual neuroscience.
[35] N. Block. Action in Perception by Alva Noë , 2005 .
[36] P. Pettit,et al. Looks as Powers , 2003 .
[37] S. Lehar. Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of subjective conscious experience: A Gestalt Bubble model , 2003, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
[38] C. Koch,et al. A framework for consciousness , 2003, Nature Neuroscience.
[39] A. Noë,et al. Acting out our sensory experience , 2001 .
[40] A. Noë,et al. A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. , 2001, The Behavioral and brain sciences.
[41] S. Hurley. Consciousness in Action , 2000 .
[42] F. Varela,et al. CHAPTER NINE The Specious Present: A Neurophenomenology of Time Consciousness , 2000, Naturalizing Phenomenology.
[43] C. Chabris,et al. Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events , 1999, Perception.
[44] B. Montero. The Body Problem , 1999 .
[45] Ronald A. Rensink,et al. Change-blindness as a result of ‘mudsplashes’ , 1999, Nature.
[46] A. Clark,et al. Genic Representation: Reconciling Content and Causal Complexity , 1999, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
[47] L. Pessoa,et al. Finding out about filling-in: a guide to perceptual completion for visual science and the philosophy of perception. , 1998, The Behavioral and brain sciences.
[48] S. Lehar. Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of the subjective perceptual experience , 1998 .
[49] T. Gelder,et al. The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science , 1998, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
[50] A. Clark,et al. The Extended Mind , 1998, Analysis.
[51] A. Clark. Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again , 1996 .
[52] Rajesh P. N. Rao,et al. Embodiment is the foundation, not a level , 1996, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
[53] D. Chalmers. The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory , 1996 .
[54] C. Allen,et al. Teleological Notions in Biology , 1996 .
[55] T. Gelder,et al. Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition , 1995 .
[56] R. Penrose. Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness , 1994 .
[57] Hilary Putnam,et al. Mind and World , 1994 .
[58] S. Kosslyn. Image and Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery Debate , 1994, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience.
[59] B. Aune. Speaking of Selves , 1994 .
[60] John McDowell,et al. The Content of Perceptual Experience , 1994 .
[61] K Nakayama,et al. James J. Gibson--an appreciation. , 1994, Psychological review.
[62] R. Llinás,et al. Coherent 40-Hz oscillation characterizes dream state in humans. , 1993, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
[63] E. Rosch,et al. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience , 1993 .
[64] J. O'Regan,et al. Solving the "real" mysteries of visual perception: the world as an outside memory. , 1992, Canadian journal of psychology.
[65] E. Husserl,et al. On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893-1917) , 1991 .
[66] R. L. Gregory,et al. Perceptual filling in of artificially induced scotomas in human vision , 1991, Nature.
[67] R. A. Brooks,et al. Intelligence without Representation , 1991, Artif. Intell..
[68] C. McGinn. The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Toward a Resolution , 1991 .
[69] Ned Block,et al. Consciousness and accessibility , 1990, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
[70] Ruth Garrett Millikan,et al. Compare and Contrast Dreske, Fodor, and Millikan on Teleosemantics , 1990 .
[71] Jay F. Rosenberg,et al. Language, thought and other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism , 1987 .
[72] Peter H. Salus,et al. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism , 1987 .
[73] J. Cottingham,et al. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 2 , 1985 .
[74] Fred I. Dretske,et al. Knowledge and the Flow of Information , 1985 .
[75] J. Fodor,et al. The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology , 1984 .
[76] G. McCulloch,et al. The Varieties of Reference. , 1984 .
[77] D. Lewis,et al. Mad Pain and Martian Pain , 1983 .
[78] G. Stack,et al. Molyneux's Question , 1979 .
[79] T. Burge. Individualism and the Mental , 1979 .
[80] G. McConkie,et al. Is visual information integrated across successive fixations in reading? , 1979, Perception & psychophysics.
[81] J. Romão,et al. On the phenomenology of the pomeron , 1977 .
[82] D. Lindberg,et al. Theories of vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler , 1977, Medical History.
[83] J. Tanji,et al. Anticipatory activity of motor cortex neurons in relation to direction of an intended movement. , 1976, Journal of neurophysiology.
[84] E. Matin. Saccadic suppression: a review and an analysis. , 1974, Psychological bulletin.
[85] P. Kay,et al. Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution , 1973 .
[86] F. A. Geldard,et al. The Cutaneous "Rabbit": A Perceptual Illusion , 1972, Science.
[87] Antony Flew,et al. God and the Soul , 1970 .
[88] I KOHLER,et al. Experiments with goggles. , 1962, Scientific American.
[89] A. Clark,et al. Supersizing The Mind Embodiment Action And Cognitive Extension Andy Clark , 2016 .
[90] Andy Clark,et al. Edinburgh Research Explorer Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness is (Probably) Still in the Head , 2013 .
[91] Anthony Chemero,et al. Complexity and Extended Phenomenological-Cognitive Systems , 2012, Top. Cogn. Sci..
[92] Mog Stapleton,et al. Es are good: Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended , 2012 .
[93] J. Cottingham,et al. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1 , 2012 .
[94] J. Wolfe. VISUAL EXPERIENCE: LESS THAN YOU THINK, MORE THAN YOU REMEMBER , 2011 .
[95] N. Gangopadhyay,et al. Vision without representation , 2010 .
[96] E. Thompson,et al. Mind in life : biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind , 2007 .
[97] A. Noë,et al. Can Hunter-Gatherers Hear Color? , 2007 .
[98] A. Clark. That lonesome whistle: a puzzle for the sensorimotor model of perceptual experience , 2006 .
[99] M. Bennett,et al. Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience , 2006, History & Philosophy of Psychology.
[100] A. Noë,et al. Experience of the world in time , 2006 .
[101] Alva Noë,et al. Action in Perception , 2006, Representation and Mind.
[102] J. Prinz. Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception , 2006 .
[103] R. Grush,et al. Time and experience , 2006 .
[104] M. Rowlands. Body Language: Representation in Action , 2006 .
[105] M. Wheeler. Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step , 2005 .
[106] Sean D. Kelly,et al. Cognition and the Brain: The Puzzle of Temporal Experience , 2005 .
[107] Erik Myin,et al. Skill, corporality and alerting capacity in an account of sensory consciousness. , 2005, Progress in brain research.
[108] E. Thompson,et al. Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness , 2004 .
[109] E. Myin,et al. Towards an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of “Bodiliness” and “Grabbiness” , 2004 .
[110] B. Dainton. Précis : Stream of Consciousness , 2004 .
[111] Alva Noë,et al. Neural Plasticity and Consciousness , 2003 .
[112] John L. Campbell. Reference and consciousness , 2002 .
[113] J. Kevin O'Regan,et al. Perceptual consciousness, access to modality and skill theories: A way to naturalize phenomenology? , 2002 .
[114] A. Chemero,et al. Dynamical, ecological sub-persons , 2002 .
[115] M. Tye. Consciousness, Color, and Content , 2000 .
[116] N. Block. Mental Paint and Mental Latex , 1996 .
[117] Fred I. Dretske. Naturalizing the Mind , 1995 .
[118] M. Goodale,et al. The visual brain in action , 1995 .
[119] Inman Harvey,et al. Seeing the Light: Artiicial Evolution, Real Vision Seeing the Light: Artiicial Evolution, Real Vision , 1994 .
[120] Linda B. Smith,et al. A Dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action , 1994 .
[121] Daniel C. Dennett,et al. Filling in versus finding out: A ubiquitous confusion in cognitive science , 1992 .
[122] David C. Knill,et al. Cognition: Conceptual and methodological issues. , 1992 .
[123] D. Davidson. Knowing One's Own Mind , 1987 .
[124] D. Dennett. The Intentional Stance. , 1987 .
[125] René Descartes,et al. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy , 1985 .
[126] J. O'Regan,et al. Retinal versus extraretinal influences in flash localization during saccadic eye movements in the presence of a visible background , 1984, Perception & psychophysics.
[127] Daniel C. Dennett,et al. Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology , 1981 .
[128] Sydney Shoemaker,et al. Causality and Properties , 1980 .
[129] H. Maturana,et al. Autopoiesis and Cognition : The Realization of the Living (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Scie , 1980 .
[130] N. Goodman,et al. Ways of Worldmaking , 1978 .
[131] H. Geist. Reply to Campbell. , 1965 .
[132] C. K. Ogden,et al. The Meaning of Meaning , 1923 .