The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game

We consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and Shubik. We prove that the ex ante incentive compatible core and the (interim) incentive compatible coarse core of the matching game are both non-empty.

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