Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences, we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (under two-round voting) or they just vote sincerely (under single transferable vote).

[1]  Ira Katznelson,et al.  Political science : the state of the discipline , 2002 .

[2]  Diana C. Mutz.  Impersonal influence: Effects of representations of public opinion on political attitudes , 1992 .

[3]  Matt Golder,et al.  Rehabilitating Duverger’s Theory , 2006 .

[4]  Charles A. Holt,et al.  Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled Committee Experiments , 1989 .

[5]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three- Way Elections , 1991 .

[6]  Thomas A. Rietz,et al.  An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories , 1993 .

[7]  Jean-François Laslier,et al.  The Leader Rule , 2009 .

[8]  R. Selten.  Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games , 1975, Classics in Game Theory.

[9]  Thomas A. Rietz,et al.  An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections , 1996 .

[10]  A. Blais.  Strategic Voting in the 2002 French Presidential Election , 2004 .

[11]  Rick K. Wilson,et al.  Results on Sophisticated Voting in an Experimental Setting , 1988, The Journal of Politics.

[12]  Ignacio Lago,et al.  Rational Expectations or Heuristics? , 2008 .

[13]  G. A. Miller,et al.  Book Review Nisbett, R. , & Ross, L.Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment.Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980. , 1982 .

[14]  Amnon Rapoport,et al.  Tacit co-operation in three-alternative non-cooperative voting games: A new model of sophisticated behaviour under the plurality procedure , 1988 .

[15]  Jonathan Nagler,et al.  A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections , 2000, British Journal of Political Science.

[16]  C. Plott,et al.  A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions , 1978 .

[17]  A. Blais,et al.  The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger's Elusive Factor , 1991, British Journal of Political Science.

[18]  Three-way Experimental Election Results: Strategic Voting, Coordinated Outcomes and Duverger's Law , 2008 .

[19]  R. Weber,et al.  A Theory of Voting Equilibria , 1993, American Political Science Review.

[20]  Areno Lijphart,et al.  A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990 , 1995 .

[21]  Peter C. Ordeshook,et al.  Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources , 1985 .

[22]  Jean-François Laslier,et al.  One Round versus Two Round Elections : An Experimental Study , 2007 .

[23]  Jean-François Laslier,et al.  One-round vs Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study , 2007 .

[24]  John H. Aldrich,et al.  Comparing Strategic Voting Under FPTP and PR , 2010 .

[25]  A. Blais,et al.  Strategic Vote Choice in One-round and Two-round Elections , 2008 .

[26]  André Blais,et al.  Assessing the psychological and mechanical impact of electoral rules: A quasi-experiment , 2012 .

[27]  James H. Kuklinski,et al.  Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion , 2000 .

[28]  H. Moulin.  Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes , 1979 .

[29]  J. Ishiyama,et al.  Electoral Systems , 2011 .

[30]  D. Green,et al.  Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science , 1994 .

[31]  Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections , 2009 .

[32]  André Blais,et al.  Why is there so Little Strategic Voting in Canadian Plurality Rule Elections? , 2002 .

[33]  Mathew D. McCubbins,et al.  Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality , 2000 .

[34]  Gary W. Cox,et al.  Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems , 1997 .

[35]  J. Karp,et al.  Why Politicians Like Electoral Institutions: Self‐Interest, Values, or Ideology? , 2006 .

[36]  A. Downs.  An Economic Theory of Democracy , 1957 .

[37]  S. Gosling,et al.  The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things They Leave Behind , 2008 .

[38]  W. Riker,et al.  Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice , 1982 .

[39]  John W. Patty.  Incommensurability and Issue Voting , 2007 .

[40]  Scott Keeter,et al.  STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE U.S. PUBLIC'S KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICS , 1991 .

[41]  Eyal Winter,et al.  Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency , 2009, J. Econ. Theory.

[42]  Jean Charlot.  Les partis politiques , 1974 .

[43]  Susan C. Stokes,et al.  The Oxford handbook of comparative politics , 2007 .

[44]  Richard A. Brody,et al.  Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology , 1991 .

[45]  Stephen D. Fisher,et al.  Definition and Measurement of Tactical Voting: The Role of Rational Choice , 2004, British Journal of Political Science.

[46]  Gregory A. Huber,et al.  Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships across Issue Domains and Political Contexts , 2010, American Political Science Review.

[47]  张谷.  实验经济学（Experimental Economics）研究思路及成果应用简述 , 1994 .

[48]  David P. Redlawsk,et al.  Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making , 2001 .

[49]  Virginie Béhue,et al.  La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale , 2009 .

[50]  Ian McAllister,et al.  The Australian Electoral System: Origins, Variations and Consequences , 2005 .

[51]  Sebastian Kube,et al.  (When and how) do voters try to manipulate? , 2009 .

[52]  John H. Aldrich.  Rational Choice and Turnout , 1993 .

[53]  Richard E. Nisbett,et al.  Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgement , 1981 .

[54]  James D. Laing,et al.  Prediction Analysis of Cross Classifications. , 1976 .

[55]  Steuart Henderson Britt.  Review of The people's choice: How the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign. , 1945 .

[56]  Thomas A. Rietz,et al.  Majority Requirements and Minority Representation , 2007 .

[57]  Michael Boss.  Economic theory of democracy , 1974 .

[58]  T. Tideman,et al.  Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice , 2006 .

[59]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Game theory - Analysis of Conflict , 1991 .

[60]  Ada W. Finifter,et al.  Political science : the state of the discipline , 1983 .

[61]  Dennis F. Kinsey,et al.  The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns , 1993 .

[62]  M. Duverger.  Les partis politiques , 1952 .

[63]  P. Lazarsfeld,et al.  The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign , 1968 .