WILL WE MEET AGAIN? EFFECTS OF POWER, DISTRIBUTION NORMS, AND SCOPE OF FUTURE INTERACTION IN SMALL GROUP NEGOTIATION

Two studies were conducted examining the effects of power, distribution norms, and the scope of future interaction on small group negotiation. Subjects participated in a three‐person negotiation exercise in which they had to reach agreements between two or three players to receive resources. In study one the effects of power position (high, medium, low), dominant distribution norm (contribution, need), and the expectation of future interaction (expected, not expected) on the distribution of resources were examined. Power interacted with both dominant distribution norm and the expectation of future interaction. The ability of high power, less needy players to achieve resources was reduced under a dominant need‐based distribution norm, and when future interaction was expected. In addition, groups expecting future interaction were more likely to form exclusive coalitions than those not anticipating future interaction. In study two the effects of power position (high, medium, low), type of need (pure‐need need + future potential), and the scope of future interaction (full group, coalition‐only) on the distribution of resources were examined. Power interacted with both the type of need and the scope of future interaction. Low power, more needy players achieved greater resources when need was linked to future potential and when future interaction with the entire group was anticipated. In addition, groups anticipating future interaction with only those included in the final agreement were more likely to form exclusive coalitions than those anticipating future interaction with all group members.

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