On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private

Abstract I consider a repeated prisoners' dilemma where in each period, each player receives an imperfect private signal about his opponent's current action. I show that when players are patient enough, any equilibrium where players use trigger strategies (i.e., do not revert to cooperation once they have started defecting) yields players a value arbitrarily close to the mutual minimax. I also examine the robustness of the result to perturbations of the game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72.

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