The Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy

Recent developments in microeconomic theory have shown that the self-interested behavior underlying neoclassical theory is artificially truncated: it depicts a charmingly Victorian but Utopian world in which conflicts abound but a handshake is a handshake. But a handshake is not always a handshake. Studies of principal-agent analysis, the economics of information, radical political economy, mechanism design, and transactions cost economics have all focused on the difficulties involved in policing and enforcing the actual process of market exchange. Abandoning the Victorian world of neoclassical theory will redirect economists to an older conception of their profession: what once was called political economy. By taking optimizing more seriously, post-Walrasian economics has inspired a revolution in economic thought fostering both new theoretical departures and alternative conceptions of the capitalist economy. We will offer our own interpretation of this literature, focusing on the widely recognized fact that the terms arising from exchange are not generally enforceable at zero cost to the exchanging parties. Where some aspect of the good or service supplied is both valuable to the buyer and costly to provide, the absence of third-party enforcement of claims gives rise to endogenous enforcement strategies. We refer to this relationship as a "contested exchange" because, unlike the transactions of Walrasian economics, the benefit the parties derive from the transaction depends on their own capacities to enforce competing claims.

[1]  George A. Akerlof An economic theorist's book of tales , 1984 .

[2]  H. Gintis A Radical Analysis of Welfare Economics and Individual Development , 1972 .

[3]  W. Wagner,et al.  Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought , 1987 .

[4]  B. Klein,et al.  The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance , 1981, Journal of Political Economy.

[5]  N. Ireland,et al.  The co-operative game theory of the firm , 1984 .

[6]  J. Elster Social Norms and Economic Theory , 1989, Handbook of Monetary Policy.

[7]  H. Gintis,et al.  Towards a Post-Marxist Radical Social Theory@@@Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought. , 1987 .

[8]  H. Gintis,et al.  Contested Exchange: New Microfoundations for the Political Economy of Capitalism , 1990 .

[9]  E. Maskin,et al.  Advances in Economic Theory: The theory of incentives: an overview , 1982 .

[10]  S. Bowles,et al.  Heart and Minds: A Social Model of U.S. Productivity Growth , 1983 .

[11]  A. Lerner,et al.  The Economics and Politics of Consumer Sovereignty , 1972 .

[12]  James B. Rebitzer Radical Political Economy and the Economics of Labor Markets , 1993 .

[13]  L. Walras Elements of Pure Economics , 1954 .

[14]  Lorne Carmichael Can Unemployment Be Involuntary? Comment [Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device] , 1985 .

[15]  H. Gintis,et al.  Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of , 1976 .

[16]  Stephen A. Marglin,et al.  What Do Bosses Do? , 1974 .

[17]  Samuel Bowles,et al.  The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models , 1985 .

[18]  D. North,et al.  Structure and Change in Economic History , 1983 .

[19]  L. Cavalli-Sforza Cultural transmission and evolution , 1981 .

[20]  W. Dugger The Economic Institutions of Capitalism , 1987 .

[21]  Alan Grafen,et al.  The hawk-dove game played between relatives , 1979, Animal Behaviour.

[22]  H. Gintis Welfare Criteria with Endogenous Preferences: The Economics of Education , 1974 .

[23]  Sally Sampson The limits of liberty , 1993 .

[24]  H. Gintis,et al.  Schooling in capitalist America : educational reform and the contradictions of economic life , 1977 .

[25]  F. Green,et al.  The Worker Discipline Effect: A Disaggregative Analysis , 1990 .

[26]  S. Bowles,et al.  Employment Rents and the Incidence of Strikes , 1987 .

[27]  C. Shapiro,et al.  Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device , 1984 .

[28]  J. Stiglitz,et al.  Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information , 1981 .

[29]  Kenneth J. Arrow,et al.  Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities , 1970 .

[30]  J. Roemer,et al.  Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation , 1992 .

[31]  S. Shavell Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship , 1979 .

[32]  Joseph E. Stiglitz,et al.  THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEPENDENCE OF QUALITY ON PRICE , 1987 .

[33]  H. Demsetz,et al.  Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization , 1975, IEEE Engineering Management Review.

[34]  O. Williamson The Economics of Governance: Framework and Implications , 1984 .

[35]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The Evolution of Cooperation , 1984 .

[36]  O. Williamson,et al.  The firm as a nexus of treaties , 1992 .

[37]  M. Sahlins Stone Age Economics , 2020 .

[38]  D. E. Matthews Evolution and the Theory of Games , 1977 .

[39]  O. Williamson The economic institutions of capitalism , 1985 .

[40]  H. Gintis,et al.  Power and wealth in a competitive capitalist economy , 1992 .

[41]  C. Shapiro,et al.  Can Unemployment Be Involuntary? Reply [Equilibrium Unemployemnt as a Worker Discipline Device] , 1985 .

[42]  H. Gintis The Nature of Labor Exchange and the Theory of Capitalist Production , 1976 .

[43]  James B. Rebitzer Unemployment, Long-Term Employment Relations, and Productivity Growth , 1987 .