Polling in a proportional representation system

We study the effects of opinion polls on election results in proportional representation systems. Moderate voters have preferences over the vote shares received by the parties so that an agent’s optimal voting decision might depend on the other agents’ behavior. A voter’s information about other voters’ behavior can be improved through a series of opinion polls. We show that the mass of undecided voters decreases monotonically with the number of polls, but may not necessarily disappear. Voters who remain undecided have centrist ideologies. On average a series of polls brings the society closer to complete information even though specific polls may push the election result away from the complete information case.

[1]  Power sharing and electoral equilibrium , 2014 .

[2]  Joseph McMurray,et al.  The Marginal Voter's Curse , 2016, The Economic Journal.

[3]  R. Sugden,et al.  Regret Theory: An alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty Review of Economic Studies , 1982 .

[4]  Elhanan Helpman,et al.  Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics , 1994 .

[5]  Ming Li,et al.  A psychologically-based model of voter turnout , 2010 .

[6]  A. Schram,et al.  Public opinion polls, voter turnout, and welfare: An experimental study , 2010 .

[7]  John Duggan,et al.  Private polling in elections and voter welfare , 2009, J. Econ. Theory.

[8]  Keith Dowding,et al.  Is it Rational to Vote? Five Types of Answer and a Suggestion , 2005 .

[9]  Leonard J. Savage,et al.  The Theory of Statistical Decision , 1951 .

[10]  Jacob K. Goeree,et al.  Welfare Reducing Polls , 2007 .

[11]  Antonio Merlo,et al.  A Structural Model of Turnout and Voting in Multiple Elections , 2011 .

[12]  Susan B. Shimanoff.  Commonly Named Emotions in Everyday Conversations , 1984 .

[13]  Marcel Zeelenberg,et al.  On bad decisions and deciding badly: When intention-behavior inconsistency is regrettable , 2005 .

[14]  D. Sisak,et al.  Do Polls Create Momentum in Political Competition? , 2013 .

[15]  S. Ceci,et al.  Jumping on the Bandwagon with the Underdog: The Impact of Attitude Polls on Polling Behavior , 1982 .

[16]  David P. Myatt.  A Theory of Protest Voting , 2017 .

[17]  H. Rosenthal,et al.  A Theory of Divided Government , 1996 .

[18]  Ming Li,et al.  Psychologically-Based Voting with Uncertainty , 2014, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[19]  John Ferejohn,et al.  The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis , 1974, American Political Science Review.

[20]  Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin,et al.  Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions , 1998 .

[21]  Dimitrios Xefteris,et al.  Electoral Rule Disproportionality and Platform Polarization , 2013 .

[22]  T. Feddersen,et al.  Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting , 2004 .

[23]  Eyal Winter,et al.  The welfare effects of public opinion polls , 2007, Int. J. Game Theory.

[24]  Marcel Zeelenberg,et al.  The use of crying over spilled milk: a note on the rationality and functionality of regret , 1999 .

[25]  Adam Meirowitz,et al.  Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework , 2005, Games Econ. Behav..

[26]  M. Herrmann.  Polls, coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation , 2014 .

[27]  Esteban F. Klor,et al.  On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout , 2006 .

[28]  T. Feddersen,et al.  The Swing Voter's Curse , 1996 .

[29]  Humberto Llavador.  Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention , 2006, Soc. Choice Welf..

[30]  David P. Baron,et al.  Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters , 1994, American Political Science Review.

[31]  R. Duch,et al.  Coalition-directed Voting in Multiparty Democracies , 2010, American Political Science Review.

[32]  Francesco De Sinopoli,et al.  A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria , 2000, Int. J. Game Theory.

[33]  J. Ferejohn,et al.  Closeness Counts Only in Horseshoes and Dancing , 1975, American Political Science Review.

[34]  André Blais,et al.  To Vote or Not to Vote , 2000 .

[35]  Ignacio Ortuño Ortín.  A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation , 1997 .

[36]  T. Nannicini,et al.  How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign , 2013, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[37]  R. Weber,et al.  A Theory of Voting Equilibria , 1993, American Political Science Review.

[38]  Peter C. Ordeshook,et al.  Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources , 1985 .

[39]  Joseph McMurray,et al.  Voting as communicating: Mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse , 2017, Games Econ. Behav..

[40]  Nicolas Sahuguet,et al.  Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics , 2006 .

[41]  Curtis R. Taylor,et al.  Public Information and Electoral Bias , 2005 .

[42]  P. Kenney,et al.  An Empirical Examination of the Minimax Hypothesis , 1989 .

[43]  André Blais,et al.  Do People Vote on the Basis of Minimax Regret? , 1995 .

[44]  Konstantinos Matakos,et al.  Turnout and Polarization Under Alternative Electoral Systems , 2015 .

[45]  Phillip C. Stocken,et al.  Information Aggregation in Polls , 2008 .

[46]  Lionel Page,et al.  Exit polls, turnout, and bandwagon voting: Evidence from a natural experiment , 2013 .