论文信息 - An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf

An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf

Abstract Shapley and Scarf, by using the theory of balanced games, prove, in a well-known paper of 1974 ( Journal of Mathematical Economics , 1, 23–28), the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market. The present paper provides a non-constructive, simple and short proof that gives some intuition about how blocking can be done by players who have not traded.

Marilda Sotomayor | Marilda Sotomayor

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