Distributing cognitive resources in one-against-many strategy games

Many real-world situations require an agent with limited cognitive resources to be engaged in multiple games simultaneously. In these circumstances, the agent is unable to devote infinite cognitive resources to represent the optimal strategy that needs to be played against each opponent. We investigate this type of game, where a player, called the focal player, playing concurrently against multiple opponents independent 2-player games. Nevertheless, these games are coupled through the shared memory resource available to the agent. Each opponent has a fixed strategy. While the history length may vary from one opponent to another, the focal player doesn't know the opponents' strategies or which history length is used by which opponent. All the focal player can observe is the opponents' actions. We use evolutionary computation to decide on an appropriate allocation of memory to opponents. We show - given that opponents are using fixed strategies - that the memory distribution relies on the number of active bits (i.e., bits which generates a repeated pattern with a favorable payoff) that the focal player needs to exploit its opponents' strategies. We show how our current results relate to the minimum required number of bits for a player to face a set of opponents with fixed strategies, and how the number of active bits increases as the richness of the opponent strategy - measured using entropy - increases.

[1]  Xin Yao,et al.  An Experimental Study of N-Person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games , 1993, Informatica.

[2]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The evolution of cooperation. , 1984, Science.

[3]  Yi-Cheng Zhang,et al.  Emergence of cooperation and organization in an evolutionary game , 1997 .

[4]  Hussein A. Abbass,et al.  Rounds Effect in Evolutionary Games , 2007, ACAL.

[5]  R. Axelrod The Complexity of Cooperation , 2011 .

[6]  Shao-Meng Qin,et al.  Memory effect on prisoner's dilemma game in a square lattice , 2008 .

[7]  David B. Fogel,et al.  Inductive reasoning and bounded rationality reconsidered , 1999, IEEE Trans. Evol. Comput..

[8]  Hussein A. Abbass,et al.  The critical point when prisoners meet the minority: local and global dynamics in mixed evolutionary games , 2007, 2007 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation.

[9]  M. Milinski,et al.  Working memory constrains human cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. , 1998, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.

[10]  Francisco C. Santos,et al.  Individual memory and the emergence of cooperation , 2013, Animal Behaviour.

[11]  R. Sarin,et al.  Contributions to Theoretical Economics , 2010 .

[12]  Robert Axelrod,et al.  The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma , 2001 .

[13]  Xin Yao,et al.  Why more choices cause less cooperation in iterated prisoner's dilemma , 2001, Proceedings of the 2001 Congress on Evolutionary Computation (IEEE Cat. No.01TH8546).

[14]  Kay Chen Tan,et al.  Evolution and incremental learning in the iterative prisoner's dilemma , 2005, 2005 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation.

[15]  D. Helbing,et al.  The German Autobahn: an ITS test bed for examining dynamic traffic flow phenomena , 2005, Proceedings. 2005 IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2005..

[16]  Kristian Lindgren,et al.  Evolutionary phenomena in simple dynamics , 1992 .

[17]  Xin Yao,et al.  On Evolving Robust Strategies for Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma , 1993, Evo Workshops.