A sequential-arrivals model of territory acquisition II.

Birds arrive sequentially at their breeding ground where the nest sites vary in value (measured by reproductive success). Each bird may choose a vacant site or challenge an occupier for its site. In the latter case, the occupier is presumed to be the more-likely winner; the loser incurs a cost and must go to a vacant site. In a previous paper (Broom et al., 1997, J. theor. Biol.189, 257-272), we considered the optimal strategy. However, that optimal strategy was complex and perhaps could not be realized in real bird populations, making possibly costly demands both perceptually and at the coding level. With this in mind we introduce certain restricted classes of strategy, and consider how populations might evolve. Computer simulations of various populations have been performed to model the competition amongst several strategies in the presence of recurrent mutations. Certain combinations of strategies persisted and corresponded approximately to the ESSs found in Broom et al. (1997).

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