Evolutionary Game Theory

For a long time game theoretical approaches have been used for a quantitative description of the competition or cooperation of interacting individuals. These go back to von Neumann and Morgenstern [196] and meanwhile they are also empirically validated [46, 230, 233]. In game theory two aspects stand in the centre of interest—the individual attempts to maximize the personal success and the dynamics resulting from this in connection with the interactions between the individuals.

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