论文信息 - Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games

Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games

By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This clarifies some misunderstandings (in regrad to invariance and randomness), sometimes found in the Nash program.

Nir Dagan | Roberto Serrano | N. Dagan | R. Serrano

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