Department of Economics The Ohio State University Economics 817: Game Theory Syllabus and Reading List

Course Requirements: Students will present a game theory article to the class, and write a short 3-5 page referee’s report (on another article that was not presented in class). The presentation and referee’s report each count for 40% of the grade. In addition, there will be occasional homework assignments or in-class quizzes, which count for the remaining 20%. Study groups are allowed on the homework assignments, in which you can discuss the questions and talk about how to solve them. However, you need to write up the answers individually and without help, and indicate on your writeup the names of the people in your study group. Homework grades are based on full credit for a good faith effort, zero credit otherwise.

[1]  Steven Callander.  Electoral Competition in Heterogeneous Districts , 2005, Journal of Political Economy.

[2]  M. Cripps,et al.  Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations, Second Version , 2003 .

[3]  J. Ferejohn,et al.  Bargaining in Legislatures , 1989, American Political Science Review.

[4]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed , 1992 .

[5]  Xavier Vives,et al.  Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets , 1988 .

[6]  K. Bagwell.  Commitment and observability in games , 1995 .

[7]  Johannes Hörner,et al.  The wisdom of the minority , 2009, J. Econ. Theory.

[8]  E. Stacchetti,et al.  Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring , 1990 .

[9]  Douglas Gale,et al.  Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment , 1994 .

[10]  M. Jackson,et al.  Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions , 2007 .

[11]  Stephen Morris,et al.  TRADE WITH HETEROGENEOUS PRIOR BELIEFS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION , 1994 .

[12]  H. Carlsson,et al.  Global Games and Equilibrium Selection , 1993 .

[13]  R. Aumann.  Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies , 1974 .

[14]  R. Aumann.  Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality Author ( s ) , 1987 .

[15]  Raymond Deneckere,et al.  Durable Goods Monopoly with Incomplete Information , 1992 .

[16]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..

[17]  D. Bergemann,et al.  Robust Mechanism Design , 2003 .

[18]  Jeremy I. Bulow,et al.  Rational Frenzies and Crashes , 1991, Journal of Political Economy.

[19]  Lones Smith,et al.  Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning , 2000 .

[20]  J. Morgan,et al.  A Model of Expertise , 1999 .

[21]  M. Satterthwaite,et al.  Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading , 1983 .

[22]  T. Feddersen,et al.  The Swing Voter's Curse , 1996 .

[23]  Nancy L. Stokey,et al.  Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge , 1982 .

[24]  D. Bergemann,et al.  Learning and Strategic Pricing , 1996 .

[25]  L. Shapley,et al.  Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment , 1977, Journal of Political Economy.

[26]  Richard P. McLean,et al.  FULL EXTRACTION OF THE SURPLUS IN BAYESIAN AND DOMINANT STRATEGY AUCTIONS , 1988 .

[27]  R. Aumann.  Agreeing to disagree. , 1976, Nature cell biology.

[28]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Game theory - Analysis of Conflict , 1991 .

[29]  Jeremy I. Bulow,et al.  The Generalized War of Attrition Forthcoming, American Econonomic Review , 1997 .

[30]  E. Maskin,et al.  The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications , 1986 .

[31]  Robert B. Wilson,et al.  Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture , 1986 .

[32]  X. Vives,et al.  Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly , 1984 .

[33]  Dan Levin,et al.  To grab for the market or to bide one's time: a dynamic model of entry , 2003 .

[34]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information , 1986 .

[35]  David Pearce.  Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection , 1984 .

[36]  Marco Battaglini,et al.  Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk , 2002 .

[37]  Johannes Hörner,et al.  Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons , 2006 .

[38]  Karl Shell,et al.  Liquid markets and competition , 1990 .

[39]  A. Pavan,et al.  Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks , 2004 .

[40]  J. Sobel,et al.  STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION , 1982 .

[41]  Frank Heinemann,et al.  American Economic Association Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks : Comment , 2015 .

[42]  Dan Levin,et al.  Investment dynamics with common and private values , 2005, J. Econ. Theory.

[43]  Huberto M. Ennis,et al.  Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation , 2009, J. Econ. Theory.

[44]  Bart J. Wilson,et al.  Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition, Demand Uncertainty, and Asymmetric Outcomes , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.