Interacting Supply Chain Distortions: The Pricing of Internal Transfers and External Procurement

This paper examines the impact of distortions wrought by transfer pricing when a firm is engaged in both internal production and external procurement of inputs. In particular, we demonstrate that a firm can actually glean benefits from often‐discussed transfer‐pricing problems in dealing with an external supplier. Though transfer prices above marginal cost introduce inter‐division coordination problems, they also introduce a lower willingness to pay to outside suppliers. Knowing that costly internal transfers will eat into demand, the supplier is more willing to set lower prices. Such supplier discounts can make decentralization worthwhile for the firm. This benefit of decentralization is shown to be robust to variations in both downstream and upstream competition.

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