Price, authority and trust in international distribution channel relationships

This paper focuses on inter-firm transactions in international distribution channels. Special interest is paid to the governance of inter-firm transactions. We argue that price, authority and trust represent different governance mechanisms, which can be combined into a governance vector. Price reflects the use of market mechanisms, while authority means the reliance on organizational mechanisms such as rules and procedures. Trust, on the other hand, implies monitoring transactions by social norms and the development of personal relationships. A model is developed and empirically explored in the context of international distribution of Norwegian farmed salmon.

[1]  T. Cook,et al.  Quasi-experimentation: Design & analysis issues for field settings , 1979 .

[2]  O. Williamson.  Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives , 1994 .

[3]  W. Dugger.  The Economic Institutions of Capitalism , 1987 .

[4]  Wolfgang Streeck,et al.  Community, market, state and associations? : the prospective contribution of interest governance to social order , 1985 .

[5]  Håkan Håkansson,et al.  Industrial technological development : a network approach , 1987 .

[6]  Jan B. Heide,et al.  Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationships? , 1992 .

[7]  John R. Nevin,et al.  Performance Outcomes of Purchasing Arrangements in Industrial Buyer-Vendor Relationships , 1990 .

[8]  E. Corey.  Procurement Management: Strategy, Organization, and Decision-Making , 1978 .

[9]  P. Ring,et al.  Structuring cooperative relationships between organizations , 1992 .

[10]  David Ford,et al.  How Do Companies Interact , 1986 .

[11]  Stewart Macaulay.  Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study , 1963 .

[12]  Robert E. Cole,et al.  Racial Factors in Site Location and Employment Patterns of Japanese Auto Firms in America , 1988 .

[13]  W. Ouchi,et al.  The Logic of Joint Research and Development , 1988 .

[14]  M. Gerlach,et al.  Business Alliances and the Strategy of the Japanese Firm , 1987 .

[15]  Jeffrey L. Bradach,et al.  Price, Authority, and Trust: From Ideal Types to Plural Forms , 1989 .

[16]  Ian R. Macneil.  The new social contract: An inquiry into modern contractual relations , 1980 .

[17]  J. Pfeffer,et al.  The External Control of Organizations. , 1978 .

[18]  Jan B. Heide,et al.  The Role of Dependence Balancing in Safeguarding Transaction-Specific Assets in Conventional Channels , 1988 .

[19]  J. Lewis,et al.  Trust as a Social Reality , 1985 .

[20]  S. Shapiro.  The Social Control of Impersonal Trust , 1987, American Journal of Sociology.

[21]  Jan B. Heide,et al.  ALLIANCES IN INDUSTRIAL PURCHASING - THE DETERMINANTS OF JOINT ACTION IN BUYER-SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS , 1990 .

[22]  L. Hallén,et al.  Interfirm Adaptation in Business Relationships , 1991 .

[23]  R. Eccles.  The quasifirm in the construction industry , 1981 .

[24]  Mark S. Granovetter.  Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness , 1985, American Journal of Sociology.

[25]  F. Dwyer,et al.  A Transaction Cost Perspective on Vertical Contractual Structure and Interchannel Competitive Strategies , 1988 .

[26]  Thomas Palay,et al.  Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of Informal Agreements , 1985 .

[27]  F. Dwyer,et al.  Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships: , 1987 .

[28]  H. Håkansson.  International Marketing and Purchasing of Industrial Goods: An Interaction Approach , 1982 .

[29]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The Evolution of Cooperation , 1984 .