论文信息 - Regular equilibrium points of n-person games in normal form

Regular equilibrium points of n-person games in normal form

Harsanyi introduced ~~gular equilibrium points in [3J and proved that for almost all noncooperative n-person games in normal form all equilibriUm points are regular. In this paper it is shown that regular equilibrium points are essential, quasi-strong, proper and perfect. Hence, for almost all games in normal form all equilibrium points are quasistrong,essential, proper and perfect.

E.E.C. van Damme

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