To detect or not to detect: A replication and extension of the three-stage model.

When faced with a decision, people generally show a bias toward heuristic processing, even if it leads to the incorrect decision, such as in the base-rate neglect task. The crucial question is whether people know that they are biased. Recently, the three-stage model (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015) suggested that detecting this bias (conflict detection) is imperfect and a consistent source of bias because some people do not recognize that they are making biased decisions. In Experiment 1, participants completed a base-rate neglect task as replication of Pennycook et al. (2015). In Experiment 2, a conditional reasoning task was added as an extension to test the boundary conditions of the model. Results in Experiment 1 indicated that detection failures were a significant source of bias. However, results in Experiment 2 on the conditional reasoning task indicated that the three-stage model may be incompatible with a complex task such as conditional reasoning, an issue explored in detail in the General discussion.

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