Specifying Rules for Electronic Auctions

We examine the design space of auction mechanisms and identify three core activities that structure this space. Formal parameters qualifying the performance of core activities enable precise specification of auction rules. This specification constitutes an auction description language that can be used in the implementation of configurable marketplaces. The specification also provides a framework for organizing previous work and identifying new possibilities in auction design.

[1]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  A theory of auctions and competitive bidding , 1982 .

[2]  David Levine,et al.  CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions , 2001, IJCAI.

[3]  R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans.  Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey , 1979 .

[4]  R. McAfee,et al.  A dominant strategy double auction , 1992 .

[5]  J. Banks,et al.  Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: an experimental approach. , 1989, The Rand journal of economics.

[6]  Craig Boutilier,et al.  Solving Combinatorial Auctions Using Stochastic Local Search , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.

[7]  A. Roth,et al.  Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet , 2000 .

[8]  S. Rassenti,et al.  A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation , 1982 .

[9]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

[10]  Maria L. Gini,et al.  Magma: An Agent Based Virtual Market for Electronic Commerce , 1997, Appl. Artif. Intell..

[11]  Arne Andersson,et al.  Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination , 2000, Proceedings Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems.

[12]  J. Ledyard,et al.  A NEW AND IMPROVED DESIGN FOR MULTI-OBJECT ITERATIVE AUCTIONS , 1999 .

[13]  R. McAfee,et al.  Auctions and Bidding , 1986 .

[14]  Munindar P. Singh,et al.  Readings in agents , 1997 .

[15]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches , 1999, IJCAI.

[16]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Flexible double auctions for electronic commerce: theory and implementation , 1998, Decis. Support Syst..

[17]  Phz eMKMLafgZ,et al.  iBundle: An Efficient Ascending Price Bundle Auction , 1999 .

[18]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction , 1999, Journal of Political Economy.

[19]  R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans.  State of the Art—Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey , 1980 .

[20]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  The Michigan Internet AuctionBot: a configurable auction server for human and software agents , 1998, AGENTS '98.

[21]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction , 2000, EC '00.