Towards a Unity of the Human Behavioral Sciences

Despite their distinct objects of study, the human behavioral sciences all include models of individual human behavior. Unity in the behavioral sciences requires that there be a common underlying model of individual human behavior, specialized and enriched to meet the particular needs of each discipline. Such unity does not exist, and cannot be easily attained, since the various disciplines have incompatible models and disparate research methodologies. Yet recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for unity in the behavioral sciences, incorporating core principles from all fields, and based upon theoretical tools (game theory and the rational actor model) and data gathering techniques (experimental games in laboratory and field) that transcend disciplinary boundaries. This paper sketches a set of principles aimed at fostering such a unity. They include: (a) evolutionary and behavioral game theory provides a transdisciplinary lexicon for communication and model-building; (b) the rational actor model, rooted in biology but developed in economic theory, applies to all the human behavioral disciplines. This model treats actions as instrumental towards satisfying preferences. However, the content of preferences must be empirically determined. Moreover, the rational actor model is based on a notion of preference consistency that is not universally satisfied, so its range of applicability must also be empirically determined; (c) controlled experiments have been underutilized in most behavioral disciplines. Game theory and the rational actor model can be used as the basis for formulating, deploying, and analyzing data generated from controlled experiments with human subjects.

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