Governing the commons

[1]  A. K. Kaminski.  An Institutional Theory of Communist Regimes: Design, Function, and Breakdown , 1992 .

[2]  Douglas H. Johnson,et al.  The Ecology of Survival: Case Studies from Northeast African History , 1991 .

[3]  G. G. Stevenson.  Common Property Economics: A General Theory and Land Use Applications , 1991 .

[4]  Vernon L. Smith,et al.  Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology , 1991, Journal of Political Economy.

[5]  E. Ostrom,et al.  Rules and games , 1991 .

[6]  Elinor Ostrom,et al.  Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement Without Guards , 1991 .

[7]  Werner Güth,et al.  On Supergames and Folk Theorems: A Conceptual Discussion , 1991 .

[8]  Anarchy and Agreement — A Game Theoretic Analysis of Some Aspects of Contractarianism , 1991 .

[9]  E. Ostrom,et al.  Rent Dissipation and Balanced Deviation Disequilibrium in Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence , 1991 .

[10]  The land boards of Botswana: a problem in institutional design. , 1990 .

[11]  Elinor Ostrom,et al.  The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems , 1990 .

[12]  Richard Apostle.  Uncommon Property: The Fishing and Fish-Processing Industries in British Columbia , 1990 .

[13]  Anthony Charles,et al.  Co-operative Management of Local Fisheries: New Directions for Improved Management and Community Development , 1990 .

[14]  James M. Acheson,et al.  The lobster gangs of Maine. , 1990 .

[15]  Douglass C. North,et al.  Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England , 1989, The Journal of Economic History.

[16]  J. Elster,et al.  The Cement Of Society , 1989 .

[17]  D. Feeny,et al.  The benefits of the commons , 1989, Nature.

[18]  R. Holcombe,et al.  Government By Contract , 1989 .

[19]  J. Nugent,et al.  The efficiency of the mesta: A parable , 1989 .

[20]  E. Ostrom.  Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems , 1989 .

[21]  B. Neis,et al.  Uncommon Property: The Fishing and Fish-Processing Industries in British Columbia , 1989 .

[22]  B. J. Harrell.  The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources , 1989 .

[23]  F. Berkes,et al.  A comparative study of yield, investment and energy use in small-scale fisheries: Some considerations for resource planning , 1989 .

[24]  D. Bromley,et al.  Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Foundations of Public Policy , 1989 .

[25]  F. Scharpf.  Decision Rules, Decision Styles and Policy Choices , 1989 .

[26]  George Tsebelis,et al.  The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy , 1989, American Political Science Review.

[27]  V. Vanberg,et al.  Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice , 1989 .

[28]  Gary D. Libecap,et al.  Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Rights , 1989 .

[29]  J. Wallis.  Towards a Positive Economic Theory of Institutional Change , 1989 .

[30]  Donald H. Negri.  The common property aquifer as a differential game , 1989 .

[31]  Fikret Berkes,et al.  Common property resources : ecology and community-based sustainable development , 1989 .

[32]  F. Berkes,et al.  On the diversification of common-property resource use by Indian society. , 1989 .

[33]  Margaret Levi,et al.  Of Rule and Revenue , 1991 .

[34]  John C. Harsanyi,et al.  Общая теория выбора равновесия в играх / A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games , 1989 .

[35]  R. Wade,et al.  Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India , 1989 .

[36]  R. Axelrod,et al.  The Further Evolution of Cooperation , 1988, Science.

[37]  R. Mark Isaac,et al.  Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism , 1988 .

[38]  F. Scharpf,et al.  THE JOINT‐DECISION TRAP: LESSONS FROM GERMAN FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION , 1988 .

[39]  Trading Water: An Economic and Legal Framework for Water Marketing , 1988 .

[40]  J. F. Richards,et al.  World Deforestation in the Twentieth Century , 1988 .

[41]  S. Fenoaltea.  Transaction Costs, Whig History, and the Common Fields , 1988 .

[42]  M. Levi.  The Transformation of Agrarian Institutions: An Introduction and Perspective , 1988 .

[43]  Ralph Matthews,et al.  Regulating the Newfoundland Inshore Fishery: Traditional Values Versus State Control in the Regulation of a Common Property Resource , 1988 .

[44]  Giandomenico Majone,et al.  Confronting Public Sector Complexity@@@Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector , 1988 .

[45]  J. Coleman.  FREE RIDERS AND ZEALOTS: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS , 1988 .

[46]  T. Panayotou.  Management concepts for small-scale fisheries: economic and social aspects , 1988 .

[47]  B. Frey.  Political economy and institutional choice , 1988 .

[48]  J. Kagan,et al.  Rational choice in an uncertain world , 1988 .

[49]  Harold Brookfield,et al.  Land degradation and society , 1988 .

[50]  V. Ostrom,et al.  The Political Theory of a Compound Republic: Designing the American Experiment , 1988 .

[51]  Ronald J. Oakerson.  The organization of local public economies , 1987 .

[52]  L. Samuelson.  A note on uncertainty and cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma , 1987 .

[53]  J. M. Buchanan.  The constitution of economic policy. , 1987, Science.

[54]  Jacqueline McGlade,et al.  Modelling complex human systems: A fisheries example , 1987 .

[55]  Isaac Ehrlich,et al.  On the Issue of Causality in the Economic Model of Crime and Law Enforcement: Some Theoretical Considerations and Experimental Evidence , 1987 .

[56]  Dilip Mookherjee,et al.  Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action , 1987, American Political Science Review.

[57]  B. Weingast,et al.  The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power , 1987, American Political Science Review.

[58]  Douglas D. Heckathorn,et al.  Bargaining and Constitutional Contracts , 1987 .

[59]  D. Bromley,et al.  Institutional development for local management of rural resources , 1987 .

[60]  A theory of the spoils system , 1987 .

[61]  Michael Taylor.  The possibility of cooperation , 1987 .

[62]  R. Aumann.  Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality Author ( s ) , 1987 .

[63]  R. Matthews,et al.  The Economics of Institutions and the , 1986 .

[64]  O. Williamson,et al.  The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. , 1986, American Political Science Review.

[65]  N. Uphoff.  Local Institutional Development: An Analytical Sourcebook With Cases , 1986 .

[66]  Amartya Sen,et al.  Prediction and economic theory , 1986, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. A. Mathematical and Physical Sciences.

[67]  Fikret Berkes,et al.  Local-level management and the commons problem: A comparative study of Turkish coastal fisheries☆☆☆ , 1986 .

[68]  J. Perrolle,et al.  Community Resource Management: Lessons from the Zanjera. , 1986, The Journal of Asian Studies.

[69]  U. Witt.  Evolution and Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable Contracts , 1986 .

[70]  C. Runge,et al.  Common property and collective action in economic development , 1986 .

[71]  George Ainslie,et al.  Choice and Consequence: Perspectives of an Errant Economist.Thomas C. Schelling , 1986 .

[72]  E. Wolf.  the vicissitudes of the closed corporate peasant community , 1986 .

[73]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information , 1986 .

[74]  Michael R. Dove.  Peasant versus Government Perception and Use of the Environment: A Case-study of Banjarese Ecology and River Basin Development in South Kalimantan , 1986, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies.

[75]  J. Lundqvist.  Irrigation development and central control: some features of Sri Lankan development , 1986 .

[76]  G. Teubner,et al.  Neo-Institutional Economic Theory: Issues of Landlord and Tenant Law , 1986 .

[77]  The training of Mahaweli turnout group leaders , 1986 .

[78]  R. Sugden.  The Economics of Rights, Co-Operation, and Welfare , 1986 .

[79]  John G. Wilson,et al.  Subjective Probability and the Prisoner's Dilemma , 1986 .

[80]  Lack of maintenance of irrigation facilities: experiences from southern Sri Lanka. , 1986 .

[81]  Veijo Kaitala,et al.  Game Theory Models of Fisheries Management — a Survey , 1986 .

[82]  K. Opp.  The Evolution of a Prisoner’s Dilemma in the Market , 1986 .

[83]  W. Raub,et al.  Conditions for Cooperation in Problematic Social Situations , 1986 .

[84]  Farmer participation in water management in the Mahaweli projects , 1986 .

[85]  D. Snidal.  Coordination versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes , 1985, American Political Science Review.

[86]  Institutional Capacity And The Resolution Of A Commons Dilemma , 1985 .

[87]  J. Farr.  Situational Analysis: Explanation in Political Science , 1985, The Journal of Politics.

[88]  G. Marwell,et al.  A Theory of the Critical Mass. I. Interdependence, Group Heterogeneity, and the Production of Collective Action , 1985, American Journal of Sociology.

[89]  The Evolution Of Individual Property Rights In Massachusetts Agriculture, 17th-19th Centuries , 1985 .

[90]  Fikret Berkes,et al.  Fishermen and ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ , 1985, Environmental Conservation.

[91]  Gary D. Libecap,et al.  The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization , 1985, Journal of Political Economy.

[92]  A. Gupta.  Managing Common Properties: Some Issues in Institutional Design , 1985 .

[93]  F. Berkes.  The common property resource problem and the creation of limited property rights , 1985 .

[94]  Pierre-Jacques Courtois,et al.  On time and space decomposition of complex structures , 1985, CACM.

[95]  Gary D. Libecap,et al.  Oil field unitization: contractual failure in the presence of imperfect information , 1985 .

[96]  J. A. Moore.  Science as a Way of Knowing—Human Ecology , 1985 .

[97]  The Optimal Commons , 1985 .

[98]  Common property resource management in South Indian villages , 1985 .

[99]  A. Rapoport.  Provision of Public Goods and the MCS Experimental Paradigm , 1985, American Political Science Review.

[100]  J. Elster.  Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality , 1985 .

[101]  N. Uphoff.  People's participation in water management: Gal Oya, Sri Lanka. , 1985 .

[102]  Norman Uphoff,et al.  Fitting projects to people. , 1985 .

[103]  E. Coward.  Technical and social change in currently irrigated regions: rules, roles, and rehabilitation. , 1985 .

[104]  P. David.  Clio and the Economics of QWERTY , 1985 .

[105]  C. Runge.  Strategic Interdependence in Models of Property Rights , 1984 .

[106]  D. Bromley,et al.  The Village Against the Center: Resource Depletion in South Asia , 1984 .

[107]  Rick K. Wilson.  Constraints on social dilemmas: An institutional approach , 1984, Ann. Oper. Res..

[108]  Stephen Sandford,et al.  Management of Pastoral Development in the Third World , 1984 .

[109]  H. Sinn.  Common Property Resources, Storage Facilities and Ownership Structures: A Cournot Model of the Oil Market , 1984 .

[110]  Michael Hechter.  When Actors Comply: Monitoring Costs and the Production of Social Order , 1984 .

[111]  J. Gus Liebenow.  Malawi: clean water for the rural poor Part two – construction and maintenance , 1984 .

[112]  T. Bayliss-Smith,et al.  Social organisation and irrigation: ideology, planning and practice in Sri Lanka's settlement schemes , 1984 .

[113]  C. Runge,et al.  Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action , 1984, The Journal of Politics.

[114]  John R. Harris,et al.  Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics , 1984 .

[115]  Property Rights and Economic Incentives in Resource and Environmental Systems , 1984 .

[116]  P. P. Karan,et al.  Understanding green revolutions: agrarian change and development planning in South Asia. , 1984 .

[117]  K. Ruddle,et al.  Maritime institutions in the Western Pacific , 1984 .

[118]  R. Mark Isaac,et al.  Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations , 1984 .

[119]  W. Welch.  The political feasibility of full ownership property rights: The cases of pollution and fisheries , 1983 .

[120]  E. Rolph.  Government allocation of property rights: Who gets what? , 1983 .

[121]  John Orbell,et al.  The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems , 1983, American Political Science Review.

[122]  O. Williamson.  Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange , 1983 .

[123]  Household viability and economic differentiation in Gama, Sri Lanka : an anthropological study of paddy producing households participating in the Green Revolution within an irrigation settlement in Sri Lanka , 1983 .

[124]  Partha Dasgupta,et al.  The control of resources. , 1983 .

[125]  Albert Breton,et al.  The logic of bureaucratic conduct , 1983 .

[126]  M. McKean.  The Japanese Experience With Scarcity: Management of Traditional Common Lands , 1982, Environmental Review.

[127]  Donald T. Campbell,et al.  Legal and primary-group social controls , 1982 .

[128]  Hugh Ward,et al.  Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision , 1982 .

[129]  David M. Kreps,et al.  Reputation and imperfect information , 1982 .

[130]  David M. Kreps,et al.  Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma , 1982 .

[131]  F. Korten.  Building national capacity to develop water users' associations : experience from the Philippines , 1982 .

[132]  Karl-Dieter Opp,et al.  The evolutionary emergence of norms , 1982 .

[133]  R. Netting,et al.  Leveling peasants? the maintenance of equality in a Swiss Alpine community , 1982 .

[134]  Brian Barry,et al.  Rational Man and Irrational Society?: An Introduction and Sourcebook , 1982 .

[135]  E. Rolph.  Government Allocation of Property Rights: Why and How , 1982 .

[136]  Dale Rogers Marshall,et al.  Institutions of rural development for the poor : decentralization and organizational linkages , 1982 .

[137]  P. Alexander.  Sri Lankan fishermen: Rural capitalism and peasant society , 1982 .

[138]  W. R. Waters.  The Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an Economic Institution , 1982 .

[139]  Communalism and conflict in the Swiss Alps , 1982 .

[140]  Gavin J. Wright.  An evolutionary theory of economic change , 1982 .

[141]  M. Shubik.  Game theory in the social sciences: Concepts and solutions , 1982 .

[142]  Keith C. Knapp,et al.  Barriers to Effective Ground‐Water Management: The California Casea , 1982 .

[143]  Regulation and the Location of Jurisdictional Powers: The Fishery , 1982 .

[144]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The evolution of cooperation. , 1984, Science.

[145]  D. North.  Structure and Change in Economic History , 1983 .

[146]  C. Runge.  Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance, and Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context , 1981 .

[147]  Economic aspects and policy issues in groundwater development , 1981 .

[148]  Richard B. Norgaard,et al.  Sociosystem and ecosystem coevolution in the amazon , 1981 .

[149]  R. Axelrod.  The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists , 1981, American Political Science Review.

[150]  Keith Jamtgaard,et al.  OVERGRAZING IN PASTORAL AREAS THE COMMONS RECONSIDERED , 1981 .

[151]  A. Schotter.  The Economic Theory of Social Institutions , 1981 .

[152]  Richard G Kimber.  Collective Action and the Fallacy of the Liberal Fallacy , 1981, World Politics.

[153]  M. Galanter.  Justice in many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law , 1981 .

[154]  速水 佑次郎,et al.  Asian village economy at the crossroads : an economic approach to institutional change , 1981 .

[155]  W. Gunasekera.  The role of traditional water management in modern paddy cultivation in Sri Lanka , 1981 .

[156]  F. Berkes,et al.  Self-Regulation of Commercial Fisheries of the Outer Long Point Bay, Lake Erie , 1981 .

[157]  Robert J. Smith.  Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in Wildlife , 1981 .

[158]  D. Magnusson.  Toward A Psychology of Situations : An Interactional Perspective , 1981 .

[159]  H. Wiarda,et al.  The Centralist Tradition of Latin America , 1981 .

[160]  D. Korten.  Community Organization and Rural Development : A Learning Process Approach , 1980 .

[161]  V. Ostrom,et al.  Artisanship and Artifact , 1980 .

[162]  W. Riker.  Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions , 1980, American Political Science Review.

[163]  P. Oliver.  Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations , 1980, American Journal of Sociology.

[164]  Richard A. Posner,et al.  A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law , 1980, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[165]  The Human Costs of Development , 1980 .

[166]  Susan B. Shimanoff.  Communication Rules: Theory and Research , 1980 .

[167]  D. Bromley,et al.  Water Reform and Economic Development: Institutional Aspects of Water Management in the Developing Countries , 1980, Economic Development and Cultural Change.

[168]  G. Marwell,et al.  Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem , 1980, American Journal of Sociology.

[169]  Colin W. Clark,et al.  Restricted Access to Common-Property Fishery Resources: A Game-Theoretic Analysis , 1980 .

[170]  P. Pradhan.  Local institutions and people's participation in rural public works in Nepal. , 1980 .

[171]  E. W. Coward,et al.  Irrigation and agricultural development in Asia: perspectives from the social sciences. , 1980 .

[172]  L. Telser.  A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements , 1980 .

[173]  B. McCay.  A Fishermen's Cooperative, Limited: Indigenous Resource Management in a Complex Society , 1980 .

[174]  A. Field.  On the Explanation of Rules Using Rational Choice Models , 2008 .

[175]  P. Dasgupta,et al.  Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources , 1980 .

[176]  D. Snidal.  Public Goods, Property Rights, and Political Organizations , 1979 .

[177]  D. Hofstadter,et al.  Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid , 1979 .

[178]  O. Williamson.  Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations , 1979, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[179]  W. Shepard,et al.  Forcing Squares, Triangles and Ellipses Into a Circular Paradigm: the Use of the Commons Dilemma in Examining the Allocation of Common Resources , 1979 .

[180]  R. McKelvey.  General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models , 1979 .

[181]  A. Scott.  Development of Economic Theory on Fisheries Regulation , 1979 .

[182]  W. C. Mackenzie.  Rational Fishery Management in a Depressed Region: the Atlantic Groundfishery , 1979 .

[183]  Evolution of Canadian Fisheries Management Towards Economic Rationalization , 1979 .

[184]  G. Marwell,et al.  Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem , 1979, American Journal of Sociology.

[185]  J. E. Coward.  Principles of Social Organization in an Indigenous Irrigation System , 1979 .

[186]  K. Shepsle.  Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models , 1979 .

[187]  B. McCay.  “Fish is Scarce”: Fisheries Modernization on Fogo Island, Newfoundland , 1979 .

[188]  Kent O. Martin,et al.  Play by the Rules or Don’t Play at All: Space Division and Resource Allocation in a Rural Newfoundland Fishing Community , 1979 .

[189]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect theory: analysis of decision under risk , 1979 .

[190]  C. Plott.  The Application of Laboratory Experimental Methods to Public Choice , 1979 .

[191]  A. Giddens.  Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis , 1979 .

[192]  K. Opp.  The Emergence and Effects of Social Norms: A Confrontation of Some Hypotheses of Sociology and Economics , 1979 .

[193]  The management of irrigation systems in Sri Lanka , 1979 .

[194]  R. L. Anderson,et al.  ... and the Desert Shall Rejoice: Conflict, Growth, and Justice in Arid Environments , 1979 .

[195]  J. Yelling,et al.  Common Field and Enclosure in England, 1450-1850 , 1978 .

[196]  B. McCay.  Systems ecology, people ecology, and the anthropology of fishing communities , 1978 .

[197]  D. Orr,et al.  Leviathan, the Open Society, and the Crisis of Ecology , 1978 .

[198]  J. Orbell,et al.  Institutional Solutions to the N-Prisoners' Dilemma , 1978, American Political Science Review.

[199]  W. Shepard,et al.  Population Issues and Commons Dilemmas , 1978 .

[200]  A. Neher,et al.  The Pure Theory of Muggery , 1978 .

[201]  R. Selten.  The chain store paradox , 1978 .

[202]  T. Schelling.  Micromotives and Macrobehavior , 1978 .

[203]  D. North.  Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History , 1978 .

[204]  Reinhard Sel Ten.  THE EQUITY PRINCIPLE IN ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR , 1978 .

[205]  A. Tocqueville,et al.  The old régime and the French Revolution , 1978 .

[206]  Ronald J Oakerson.  The erosion of public highways : a policy analysis of the eastern Kentucky coal-haul road problem , 1978 .

[207]  O. Williamson,et al.  Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. , 1977 .

[208]  R. Lewontin.  ‘The Selfish Gene’ , 1977, Nature.

[209]  W. Ophuls.  Ecology and the politics of scarcity , 1977 .

[210]  Edna Ullmann-Margalit,et al.  The Emergence Of Norms , 1977 .

[211]  Robyn M. Dawes,et al.  Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons dilemma situation. , 1977 .

[212]  J. Harriss.  Problems of Water Management in Hambantota District , 1977 .

[213]  The Governance of Common Property Resources , 1977 .

[214]  M. C. Jensen,et al.  Harvard Business School; SSRN; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Harvard University - Accounting & Control Unit , 1976 .

[215]  R. McKelvey.  Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control , 1976 .

[216]  R. Netting.  What alpine peasants have in common: Observations on communal tenure in a Swiss village , 1976 .

[217]  The Insoluble Problem of the Social Contract , 1976 .

[218]  Utility Maximizers in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas , 1976, Dialogue.

[219]  R. J. Agnello,et al.  Property Rights and Efficiency in the Oyster Industry , 1975, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[220]  Robert E. Rhoades,et al.  adaptive strategies in alpine environments: beyond ecological particularism1 , 1975 .

[221]  J. Acheson.  The lobster fiefs: Economic and ecological effects of territoriality in the maine lobster industry , 1975 .

[222]  H. Demsetz,et al.  Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization , 1975, IEEE Engineering Management Review.

[223]  T. Iles.  The Management of Marine Fisheries. , 1975 .

[224]  P. G. Stillman.  The Tragedy of the Commons: A Re-Analysis. , 1975 .

[225]  R. A. Meyer,et al.  The Technology of Public Goods, Externalities, and the Exclusion Principle , 1975 .

[226]  Albert Breton,et al.  The economic theory of representative government , 1975 .

[227]  Robyn M. Dawes,et al.  Formal Models of Dilemmas in Social Decision-Making , 1974 .

[228]  John R. Chamberlin.  Provision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group Size , 1974, American Political Science Review.

[229]  R. Heilbroner,et al.  An Inquiry into the Human Prospect , 1974 .

[230]  R. Aumann.  Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies , 1974 .

[231]  M. McGuire.  Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdictions , 1974, Journal of Political Economy.

[232]  E. Wolf,et al.  The Hidden Frontier: Ecology and Ethnicity in an Alpine Valley , 1974 .

[233]  I. Ehrlich.  Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation , 1973, Journal of Political Economy.

[234]  Malvern Lumsden,et al.  The Cyprus Conflict as a Prisoner's Dilemma Game , 1973 .

[235]  V. Ostrom,et al.  The intellectual crisis in American public administration , 1973 .

[236]  W. Riker,et al.  An Introduction To Positive Political Theory , 1973 .

[237]  E. Duffey,et al.  Conserving Life on Earth. , 1974 .

[238]  R. Netting.  Of Men and Meadows: Strategies of Alpine Land Use , 1972 .

[239]  Omotunde E. G. Johnson.  Economic Analysis, the Legal Framework and Land Tenure Systems , 1972, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[240]  J. Faris,et al.  Cat Harbour: A Newfoundland Fishing Settlement , 1972 .

[241]  D. North,et al.  Institutional Change and American Economic Growth. , 1972 .

[242]  R. Hardin,et al.  Collective action as an agreeable N-prisoners''dilemma , 1971 .

[243]  R. Kirk.  CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY , 1970 .

[244]  Steven Cheung.  The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource , 1970, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[245]  J. Dales.  Pollution, property and prices;: An essay in policy-making and economics , 1970 .

[246]  A. Koller,et al.  Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language , 1969 .

[247]  Vernon L. Smith,et al.  On Models of Commercial Fishing , 1969, Journal of Political Economy.

[248]  G. Hardin,et al.  The Tragedy of the Commons , 1968, Green Planet Blues.

[249]  J. M. Buchanan,et al.  The Demand and Supply of Public Goods , 1968 .

[250]  Thomas F. Glick,et al.  Irrigation and Society in Medieval Valencia , 1971 .

[251]  S. Forman.  Cognition and the Catch: The Location of Fishing Spots in a Brazilian Coastal Village , 1967 .

[252]  A. Rapoport,et al.  Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas. , 1967 .

[253]  A. Sen,et al.  Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount , 1967 .

[254]  H. Demsetz.  Toward a Theory of Property Rights , 1967 .

[255]  M. Olson,et al.  The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups , 1969 .

[256]  Viktor Mikhaĭlovich Glushkov,et al.  An Introduction to Cybernetics , 1957, The Mathematical Gazette.

[257]  Noam Chomsky,et al.  वाक्यविन्यास का सैद्धान्तिक पक्ष = Aspects of the theory of syntax , 1965 .

[258]  R. F. Gray.  The Sonjo Of Tanganyika , 1974 .

[259]  F. Keesing,et al.  The Ethnohistory of Northern Luzon. , 1963 .

[260]  G. Tullock,et al.  The calculus of consent : logical foundations of constitutional democracy , 1962 .

[261]  J. Jacobs.  The Death and Life of Great American Cities , 1962 .

[262]  V. Ostrom,et al.  The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry , 1961, American Political Science Review.

[263]  E. Leach,et al.  "Pul Eliya - A Village in Ceylon : A Study of Land Tenure and Kinship", E. R. Leach, London 1961 : [recenzja] / Jadwiga Kowalik. , 1961, The Journal of Asian Studies.

[264]  T. Schelling,et al.  The Strategy of Conflict. , 1961 .

[265]  Herbert Kaufman,et al.  The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior , 1960 .

[266]  R. Musgrave.  The theory of public finance : a study in public economy. , 1959 .

[267]  Howard Raiffa,et al.  Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. , 1958 .

[268]  Karl A. Wittfogel,et al.  Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power , 1957 .

[269]  A Comment on the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure , 1955 .

[270]  Paul A. Samuelson,et al.  Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure , 1955 .

[271]  Progress in Ground Water Replenishment in Southern California , 1955 .

[272]  Anthony Scott,et al.  The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership , 1955, Journal of Political Economy.

[273]  P. Samuelson.  The Pure Theory of Public Expanditure , 1954 .

[274]  A. Alchian.  Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory , 1950, Journal of Political Economy.

[275]  H. Bowen,et al.  The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources , 1943 .

[276]  H. W. Dodds,et al.  Bureaucracy and Representative Government , 1937 .

[277]  Murray Seasongood.  Local Government in the United States , 1934 .

[278]  J. R. Commons,et al.  Legal foundations of capitalism , 1925 .

[279]  J. Klein.  The Mesta; A Study in Spanish Economic History, 1273-1836 , 1921 .

[280]  F. Saussure,et al.  Course in General Linguistics , 1960 .

[281]  D. North.  Competing Technologies , Increasing Returns , and Lock-In by Historical Events , 1994 .