Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games (first version)
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Pierre Priouret,et al. Adaptive Algorithms and Stochastic Approximations , 1990, Applications of Mathematics.
[2] W. Brian Arthur,et al. On designing economic agents that behave like human agents , 1993 .
[3] David M. Kreps,et al. Learning Mixed Equilibria , 1993 .
[4] Jörgen W. Weibull,et al. Evolutionary Game Theory , 1996 .
[5] Ken Binmore,et al. Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game , 1995 .
[6] J. Hofbauer,et al. Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons and the Replicator Equation , 1995 .
[7] A. Roth,et al. Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term* , 1995 .
[8] J. Ochs. Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An Experimental Study , 1995 .
[9] R. McKelvey,et al. Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games , 1995 .
[10] E. Hopkins. Learning, Matching and Aggregation , 1995 .
[11] L. Samuelson,et al. Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection , 2010 .
[12] Daniel Friedman,et al. Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results☆☆☆ , 1997 .
[13] Martin Posch,et al. Cycling in a stochastic learning algorithm for normal form games , 1997 .
[14] Frederick W. Rankin,et al. On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games , 1997 .
[15] John H. Kagel,et al. Signalling and Adaptive Learning in an Entry Limit Pricing Game , 1997 .
[16] Tilman Börgers,et al. Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics , 1997 .
[17] S. Huck,et al. Learning in Cournot Oligopoly - An Experiment , 1999 .
[18] Nicolaas J. Vriend,et al. Will reasoning improve learning , 1997 .
[19] A. Roth,et al. Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria , 1998 .
[20] Josef Hofbauer,et al. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics , 1998 .
[21] Drew Fudenberg,et al. Learning in Games , 1998 .
[22] D. Fudenberg,et al. The Theory of Learning in Games , 1998 .
[23] John Duffy,et al. Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study , 1999, Int. J. Game Theory.
[24] D. Fudenberg,et al. Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium , 1999 .
[25] E. Hopkins. A Note on Best Response Dynamics , 1999 .
[26] Colin Camerer,et al. Experience‐weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games , 1999 .
[27] A. Rustichini. Optimal Properties of Stimulus-Response Learning Models* , 1999 .
[28] M. Hirsch,et al. Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed Games , 1999 .
[29] Nick Feltovich,et al. Reinforcement-based vs. Belief-based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-information Games , 2000 .
[30] Andreas Blume,et al. Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation , 2002 .
[31] Drew Fudenberg,et al. Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.
[32] An Insatiable Appetite for Ideas , 2001 .
[33] Jean-François Laslier,et al. A Behavioral Learning Process in Games , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..
[34] J. Hofbauer. From Nash and Brown to Maynard Smith: Equilibria, Dynamics and ESS , 2001 .
[35] Farshid Vahid,et al. Predicting How People Play Games: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..