Negotiating a Stable Government: An Application of Bargaining Theory to a Coalition Formation Model

In this paper, we apply bargaining theory to a certain model of coalition formation. The notions of a feasible government and a stable government are central in the model considered. By a government, we mean a pair consisting of a majority coalition and a policy supported by this coalition. The aim of this paper is to establish which stable government should be created if more than one stable government exists or, in case there is no stable one, which feasible government should be formed if more than one feasible government exists. Several bargaining procedures leading to the choice of one stable (or feasible) government are proposed. We define bargaining games in which only parties belonging to at least one stable (or feasible) government bargain over the creation of a government. We consider different bargaining costs. We investigate subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining games defined. It turns out that the prospects of a party depend on the procedure applied, and on the bargaining costs assumed. We also apply the coalition formation model to the Polish Parliament after the 2001 elections and apply the different bargaining games for the creation of a government to this example.

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