Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

Foreword Robert Auman Acknowledgment 1. Introduction Part I. One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model: 2. Stable matchings 3. The structure of the set of stable matchings 4. Strategic questions Part II. Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers: 5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns 6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences Part III. Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable: 7. A simple model of one seller and many buyers 8. The assignment game 9. The generalization of the assignment model Part IV. Epilogue: 10. Open questions and research directions Bibliography Indexes.

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