论文信息 - Negotiations : The Role of Information and Time Preference

Negotiations : The Role of Information and Time Preference

Abstract The alternating offers bargaining game with two pies and incomplete information has a bargaining sequential equilibrium where the “strong” type of the informed player restricts his offer to one pie, leaving it to the other player to make an offer on the second pie. An offer on both pies comes only from the “weak” type of informed player. Hence, an issue-by-issue negotiation agenda may arise from signaling considerations.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C78.

Mehmet Bac | Horst Raff | M. Baç

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