Impacts of Modeling Errors and Randomness on Topology Identification of Electric Distribution Network

A few models have been established to study the relationship between SCADA voltages in the cyber layer and the topology of electric distribution networks in the physical layer. While these models could identify the topology of distribution networks under some assumptions, one of the issues that havent been deeply studied is whether the topology of distribution networks could be identified when violating these assumptions. We define the violation of these assumptions as the impact of modeling errors which may have different characteristics comparing to other errors. When the model of using SCADA voltage correlation to identify the topology of distribution networks is constructed, a few assumptions are made such as uniformed $L$/$R$ ratio and the uncorrelated injective power which is a very strict restriction in practice. This paper focuses on understanding the impact of the identification result when violating some of these assumptions that used to established the model. Specifically, 4 cases are presented in this paper while each case contains whether violates the assumption of uniformed $L$/$R$ ratio and uncorrelated injective power or not. The analysis results show that violating each individual assumptions could cause inaccurate identification result. Also, the results show that the errors could be decreased by increasing the sample size of the SCADA voltage. Understanding the impact of errors is useful to better understand weakness of the model and find the way of decreasing errors.

[1]  Hossam Mosbah,et al.  Multilayer artificial neural networks for real time power system state estimation , 2015, 2015 IEEE Electrical Power and Energy Conference (EPEC).

[2]  Peng Ning,et al.  False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids , 2011, TSEC.

[3]  Antonio Gómez Expósito,et al.  State estimation for smart distribution substations , 2013, 2013 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting.

[4]  S. Iwamoto,et al.  New Bad Data Rejection Algorithm using Nonquadratic Objective Function for State Estimation , 2007, 2007 IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting.

[5]  Antonio Gómez Expósito,et al.  A Multilevel State Estimation Paradigm for Smart Grids , 2011, Proceedings of the IEEE.

[6]  Antonio Gómez Expósito,et al.  State estimation in two time scales for smart distribution systems , 2015, 2015 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting.

[7]  R. Baldick,et al.  Implementing nonquadratic objective functions for state estimation and bad data rejection , 1997 .

[8]  R. Romero,et al.  Identifying multiple interacting bad data in power system state estimation , 2005, IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, 2005.

[9]  Yang Liu,et al.  A survey on bad data injection attack in smart grid , 2013, 2013 IEEE PES Asia-Pacific Power and Energy Engineering Conference (APPEEC).

[10]  Vedik Basetti,et al.  A robust LWS state estimation including anomaly detection and identification in power systems , 2015, Neurocomputing.

[11]  Bikash C. Pal,et al.  Decentralized Dynamic State Estimation in Power Systems Using Unscented Transformation , 2014, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[12]  Saverio Bolognani,et al.  Identification of power distribution network topology via voltage correlation analysis , 2013, 52nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control.

[13]  Parnjit Damrongkulkamjorn,et al.  Multiple bad data identification in power system state estimation using particle swarm optimization , 2009, 2009 6th International Conference on Electrical Engineering/Electronics, Computer, Telecommunications and Information Technology.

[14]  Xinyu Yang,et al.  On False Data Injection Attacks against Distributed Energy Routing in Smart Grid , 2012, 2012 IEEE/ACM Third International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems.

[15]  Georgios B. Giannakis,et al.  Distributed Robust Power System State Estimation , 2012, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[16]  H.-J. Koglin,et al.  Bad data detection and identification , 1990 .

[17]  J. P. Pandey,et al.  Topology identification, bad data processing, and state estimation using fuzzy pattern matching , 2005, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[18]  Emilio Frazzoli,et al.  Generalized innovation and inference algorithms for hidden mode switched linear stochastic systems with unknown inputs , 2014, 53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control.

[19]  Paulo Tabuada,et al.  Robustness of attack-resilient state estimators , 2014, 2014 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS).

[20]  Bikash C. Pal,et al.  Real Time Estimation of Loads in Radial and Unsymmetrical Three-Phase Distribution Networks , 2013, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems.

[21]  Jinsub Kim,et al.  On identifiability of sparse gross errors in power system measurements , 2016, 2016 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing (GlobalSIP).

[22]  Emilio Frazzoli,et al.  Resilient state estimation against switching attacks on stochastic cyber-physical systems , 2015, 2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC).

[23]  Katherine R. Davis,et al.  Power flow cyber attacks and perturbation-based defense , 2012, 2012 IEEE Third International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm).

[24]  Klara Nahrstedt,et al.  Detecting False Data Injection Attacks on DC State Estimation , 2010 .

[25]  Ying Jun Zhang,et al.  Graphical Methods for Defense Against False-Data Injection Attacks on Power System State Estimation , 2013, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.

[26]  M. Ribbens-Pavella,et al.  Bad Data Identification Methods In Power System State Estimation-A Comparative Study , 1985, IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems.

[27]  Mehedi Hassan,et al.  Impact of cyber-attack on isolated power system , 2016, 2016 3rd International Conference on Electrical Engineering and Information Communication Technology (ICEEICT).