Strategy‐proofness and Essentially Single‐valued Cores

IN THIS PAPER WE SEARCH for solutions to various classes of allocation problems. We hand results pertaining to housing markets are much more encouraging. Roth 1982b shows that in the context of housing markets the core correspondence, which is shown to Ž. Ž . be single-valued by Roth and Postlewaite 1977 , is strategy-proof. Moreover Ma 1994 shows that it is the only solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof.

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