论文信息 - Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets

Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets

Abstract Building on Ma (1994) and Fujinaka and Wakayama (2018) , this paper characterizes the top trading cycles rule in housing markets without the help of strategy-proofness, by the following two groups of axioms: individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, rank monotonicity; individual rationality, endowments-swapping-proofness, rank monotonicity.

Yajing Chen | Fang Zhao | Yajing Chen | Fang Zhao

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