On the Optimality of Pure Bundling for a Monopolist

[1]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..

[2]  R. Zeckhauser,et al.  Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm , 1983 .

[3]  J. Rochet.  A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context , 1987 .

[4]  R. McAfee,et al.  Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design , 1988 .

[5]  M. Whinston,et al.  Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values , 1989 .

[6]  M. Amestrong.  Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing , 1993 .

[7]  M. Armstrong.  Optimal Multi-Object Auctions , 2000 .

[8]  Alejandro M. Manelli,et al.  Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist , 2006, J. Econ. Theory.

[9]  Alejandro M. Manelli,et al.  Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple-Good Monopoly , 2004, J. Econ. Theory.

[10]  Pedro Morin,et al.  Approximating optimization problems over convex functions , 2008, Numerische Mathematik.

[11]  G. Pavlov,et al.  Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods , 2011 .

[12]  Alejandro M. Manelli,et al.  Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum , 2012, Journal of Economics Theory.

[13]  Andrew Chi-Chih Yao,et al.  On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items , 2013, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[14]  Pingzhong Tang,et al.  Optimal mechanisms with simple menus , 2014, EC.

[15]  S. Hart,et al.  How Good Are Simple Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods , 2014 .

[16]  Yiannis Giannakopoulos.  Bounding Optimal Revenue in Multiple-Items Auctions , 2014, ArXiv.

[17]  Nima Haghpanah,et al.  Reverse Mechanism Design , 2014, EC.

[18]  Christos Tzamos,et al.  Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist , 2014, EC.

[19]  S. Hart,et al.  Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations , 2015 .