论文信息 - Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game. - 字舞流文

Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game.

[1] J M Smith,et al. Evolution and the theory of games , 1976 .

[2] W. Hamilton,et al. The evolution of cooperation. , 1984, Science.

[3] Michael J. Sanderson,et al. Evolution of Social Behavior by Reciprocation , 1982 .

[4] W. Hamilton,et al. The Evolution of Cooperation , 1984 .

[5] R. Sugden. The Economics of Rights, Co-Operation, and Welfare , 1986 .

[6] Marcus W. Feldman,et al. The Evolution of Helping Behavior in Large, Randomly Mixed Populations , 1986, American Naturalist.

[7] R. Boyd,et al. No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game , 1987, Nature.

[8] E. Rasmussen. Games and Information , 1989 .

[9] Roger Ware,et al. Evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner's dilemma , 1989 .