Theories of Bargaining Delays

Contract negotiations over wages are sometimes accompanied by strikes; similarly in legal contexts, settlements of damage claims may require lengthy negotiations. These and other costly delays in resolving disputes are the subject of the studies described in this article. Formulations in terms of game theory indicate that procedural features can allow delays, but the main cause may be informational disparities between the parties. Several models are described and related to data about strikes.

[1]  Sanford J. Grossman,et al.  Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information , 1986 .

[2]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  A Theory of Exit in Duopoly , 1986 .

[3]  P. Cramton.  Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty , 1984 .

[4]  R. Mnookin,et al.  Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco , 1989 .

[5]  R. Myerson.  Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem , 1979 .

[6]  Robert J. Weber,et al.  Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information , 1985, Math. Oper. Res..

[7]  R. Coase.  Durability and Monopoly , 1972, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[8]  F. Forges,et al.  Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example , 1990 .

[9]  A. Rubinstein.  Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model , 1982 .

[10]  J. Nash.  THE BARGAINING PROBLEM , 1950, Classics in Game Theory.

[11]  J. Sobel,et al.  A Multistage Model of Bargaining , 1983 .

[12]  Richard E. Wilson,et al.  STARTEGIC BARGAINING MODELS AND INTERPRETATION ON STRIKE DATA. , 1989 .

[13]  O. Hart.  Bargaining and Strikes , 1989 .

[14]  David M. Kreps,et al.  Reputation and imperfect information , 1982 .

[15]  Motty Perry.  An Example of Price Formation in Bilateral Situations: A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information , 1986 .

[16]  A. Rubinstein,et al.  A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information , 1986 .

[17]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information , 1983 .

[18]  J. Riley,et al.  Strong evolutionary equilibrium and the war of attrition. , 1980, Journal of theoretical biology.

[19]  William Samuelson.  Bargaining under Asymmetric Information. , 1984 .

[20]  Robert B. Wilson,et al.  Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture , 1986 .

[21]  Daniel R. Vincent.  Bargaining with common values , 1989 .

[22]  R. Evans.  Sequential Bargaining with Correlated Values , 1989 .

[23]  George A. Akerlof.  The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism , 1970 .

[24]  A. Rubinstein.  A BARGAINING MODEL WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT TIME PREFERENCES , 1985 .

[25]  Faruk Gul,et al.  On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty , 1988 .

[26]  Anat R. Admati,et al.  Strategic Delay in Bargaining , 1987 .

[27]  Lewis A. Kornhauser,et al.  Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce , 1979, Discussions in Dispute Resolution.

[28]  J. Riley,et al.  Asymmetric equilibria in the war of attrition , 1985 .