Fuzzy spatial models
暂无分享,去创建一个
Terry D. Clark | Jennifer M. Larson | Joshua D. Potter | Mark J. Wierman | John N. Mordeson | M. J. Wierman | J. Mordeson | T. Clark | J. Potter
[1] Ivan Jeliazkov,et al. The Uncovered Set and the Limits of Legislative Action , 2004, Political Analysis.
[2] Mathias Koenig-Archibugi,et al. Explaining Government Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy , 2004, International Organization.
[3] D. Black. The theory of committees and elections , 1959 .
[4] K. Shepsle. Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models , 1979 .
[5] J. J. Buckley,et al. Fuzzy plane geometry I: Points and lines , 1997, Fuzzy Sets Syst..
[6] Elizabeth Maggie Penn. Alternate Definitions of the Uncovered Set and Their Implications , 2006, Soc. Choice Welf..
[7] William H. Flanigan,et al. The Theory of Political Coalitions. , 1965 .
[8] C. Cioffi-Revilla. Fuzzy Sets and Models of International Relations , 1981 .
[9] Richard D. McKelvey,et al. Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice , 1986 .
[10] Lotfi A. Zadeh,et al. Fuzzy Sets , 1996, Inf. Control..
[11] Gregory S. Sanjian. Arms and Arguments: Modeling the Effects of Weapons Transfers on Subsystem Relationships , 2001 .
[12] Gregory S. Sanjian. Promoting Stability or Instability? Arms Transfers and Regional Rivalries , 1999 .
[13] Steven Thomas Seitz,et al. Apollo's oracle: Strategizing for peace , 1994, Synthese.
[14] David Austen-Smith,et al. Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure , 2005 .
[15] Jay Verkuilen,et al. Fuzzy Set Theory: Applications in the Social Sciences. Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences , 2006 .
[16] Charles C. Ragin,et al. Fuzzy-Set Social Science , 2001 .
[17] Nicholas R. Miller. In Search of the Uncovered Set , 2007, Political Analysis.
[18] Gregory S. Sanjian. A Fuzzy Set Model of NATO Decision-Making: The Case of Short-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe , 1992 .
[19] Paul Pennings,et al. Beyond dichotomous explanations: Explaining constitutional control of the executive with fuzzy-sets , 2003 .
[20] Scott de Marchi. Computational and Mathematical Modeling in the Social Sciences , 2005 .
[21] Lawrence C. Dodd,et al. Coalitions in Parliamentary Government , 1976 .
[22] M. Laver. Making and breaking governments , 1996 .
[23] Barry R. Weingast,et al. Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions , 1984 .
[24] A. Downs. An Economic Theory of Democracy , 1957 .
[25] John D. Robertson. Economic Polarization and Cabinet Formation in Western Europe , 1986 .
[26] Gregory S. Sanjian. Fuzzy Set Theory and U.S. Arms Transfers: Modeling the Decision-Making Process * , 1988 .
[27] Kenneth A. Shepsle,et al. Positive theories of congressional institutions , 1994 .
[28] Jay Verkuilen,et al. Assigning Membership in a Fuzzy Set Analysis , 2005 .
[29] K. Arrow. Social Choice and Individual Values , 1951 .
[30] Charles R. Plott,et al. A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule , 1967 .
[31] Charles Taber. POLI: An Expert System Model of U.S. Foreign Policy Belief Systems , 1992, American Political Science Review.
[32] J. J. Buckley,et al. Fuzzy plane geometry II: Circles and polygons , 1997, Fuzzy Sets Syst..
[33] J. Banks,et al. Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference , 1998 .
[34] Gregory S. Sanjian. Great Power Arms Transfers: Modeling the Decision-Making Processes of Hegemonic, Industrial, and Restrictive Exporters , 1991 .
[35] W. Riker. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions , 1980 .
[36] Gordon Tullock,et al. Why so much stability , 1981 .
[37] James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock. The Calculus of Consent , 1962 .
[38] Robert Axelrod,et al. Conflict of interest : a theory of divergent goals with applications to politics , 1971 .
[39] R. McKelvey. Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control , 1976 .
[40] George Tsebelis,et al. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work , 2002 .
[41] G. Tullock,et al. The calculus of consent : logical foundations of constitutional democracy , 1962 .
[42] Nicholas R. Miller. A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting: Further Graph- Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting , 1980 .
[43] Gregory S. Sanjian. Cold War Imperatives and Quarrelsome Clients , 1998 .
[44] Paul V. Warwick. Getting the Assumptions Right: A Reply to Laver and Shepsle , 1999, British Journal of Political Science.